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Essays on the Optimal Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes 
Hongfang Zhang 
Bang Jeon, Ph.D. 
Alina Luca, Ph.D. 
 
The way a country manages its currency can affect its volume of trade, capital 
flows and income. A country, especially one with high degree of trade openness, 
needs to find the most suitable exchange rate arrangement to reduce the volatility of 
its currency value and output. This thesis examines the optimal choice of exchange 
rate arrangements from various aspects. 
The first essay examines whether or not the Northeast Asian economies, that is, 
China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan can form a currency union, where a single currency 
and a uniform monetary policy are adopted, or an exchange rate union, where all the 
currencies are pegged to an internal or external currency or currency basket. It also 
attempts to find the optimal currency or currency basket for the four Asian economies 
if an exchange rate union is feasible. Structural VAR models with identification 
assumptions are applied to analyze the correlations of supply, exchange rate, 
monetary, and demand shocks.  The paper finds that the shocks of these four 
economies are not symmetric, implying that the Northeast Asian economies are not 
ready yet to form a common currency union. However, it is found that these 
economies can form an exchange rate union with a major currency basket including 
the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen and the Euro as currency anchor.  The paper also 
examines the option of pegging to a basket of regional currencies, similar to the Asian 
Currency Unit (ACU). 
The second essay uses panel data on emerging and developing countries to study 
the interrelationships between balance-sheet currency mismatches and the choice of 
                                                 
1 The first essay is joint work with Dr. Bang Jeon. The second essay is joint work with Dr. Alina Luca. 
 
 viii
exchange rate regimes. The evidence shows that the lack of exchange rate flexibility 
reinforces currency mismatches and increases dollar liabilities, but the estimated 
economic effects are small.  
The third essay uses a three-country model to analyze the choice of the optimal 
weights of a currency basket for emerging market economies. This model assumes 
imperfect capital mobility and allows the domestic country to impose a reserve 
requirement on capital inflows. The optimal weights are derived by minimizing the 
loss from the volatility of output and trade. The result shows that the optimal weights 
are affected by variance of the cross exchange rate between the two major currencies, 
the covariance between inflations in the two large countries and the cross exchange 
rate, the relative weights assigned to trade and output, and price and exchange rate 




CHAPTER 1: A CURRENCY UNION OR AN EXCHANG RATE UNION: 
EVIDENCE FROM NORTHEAST ASIA 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper examines whether the Northeast Asian economies, namely, China, 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, can form a currency union where a single currency and a 
uniform monetary policy are adopted or an exchange rate union where all the 
currencies are pegged to a single currency or a common currency basket.  It also 
attempts to find a currency or a currency basket for the Northeast Asian economies if 
an exchange rate union is feasible. 
The experience of the Euro rekindles an interest in the possibility of a common 
currency area2 in other regions. One of the regions of interest is East Asia. The East 
Asian countries enjoy the highest growth rate in the world. Before the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, most East Asian countries adopted a fixed exchange rate regime or a 
managed floating regime, virtually pegging to the U.S. dollar. This dollar peg makes 
the exports of countries, which compete with Japan for exports, fluctuate when the 
yen-dollar exchange rate changes. When the Japanese yen appreciates, the goods and 
services produced in Japan become less competitive. The exports of countries 
competing with Japan increase. When the Japanese yen depreciates, the products of 
Japan become more competitive. The exports of countries competing with Japan 
decline. The East Asian countries are export oriented countries. Fluctuations of trade 
can cause economic instability. So the volatility of the exchange rate between the 
Japanese yen and the U.S. dollar can lead to fluctuations in the income of the East 
                                                 
2 The idea of a common currency area was developed by Robert A. Mundell in 1961. A common 
currency area is a region where a single currency is adopted by all the countries, and there is one 
central bank that conducts an independent monetary policy. Since the establishment of this theory, 
there have been a number of studies which investigate whether a common currency area is feasible for 
different areas of the world. The introduction of the euro in 1999 is considered to be a successful 




Asian countries which compete with Japan, like Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
The crisis made many East Asian countries suffer from a decline in growth and a free-
falling currency value. Many countries are forced to float their exchange rates, which 
makes more fluctuations in exports and income. The crisis of 1997 makes more 
evident the importance of stability of the exchange rate among Asian countries. It also 
shows that the dollar peg seems to be risky for the East Asian countries. After 
learning this valuable lesson, the East Asian countries started to look for a more 
suitable exchange rate arrangement after the crisis.  
During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the East Asian countries claimed that they 
did not get enough help from the International Monetary Fund or the major lenders 
including the United States. This experience made these Asian countries realize that 
they should rely on themselves and that strengthening regional cooperation is an 
effective way to prevent crisis like one in 1997.  
Accordingly, the finance ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) plus China, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN+3) agreed on the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) in May 2000. The CMI is a swap agreement that agrees to provide 
foreign reserves to member countries facing a speculative attack. Figure 1.1 shows the 
bilateral swap arrangements of the CMI. As of November 2005, the total amount of 
bilateral swap arrangements under the CMI is $58.5 billion, more than 80% of which 
is provided by China, Japan and Korea. In 1992, ASEAN countries formed the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This agreement facilitates intra-regional trade and 
strengthens cooperation of the ASEAN countries. Japan established a partnership with 
the ASEAN in the AFTA and China agreed to form the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Area (ACFTA) with the ASEAN in 2002. Besides the CMI and the AFTA, 
ASEAN+3 also aim to promote the development of domestic bond markets and the 
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creation of a regional bond market. The increasing financial and trade cooperation of 
the East Asian countries provides academia and policy-makers with a momentum to 
evaluate the feasibility and a timetable, if possible, of forming a common currency 
area in East Asia.  
The Asian currency unit (ACU) is planned to be introduced by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) in 2006. The ACU is not legal tender. It is a statistical 
index based on a currency basket containing 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan 
and Korea.  The weight of each currency is determined by GDP and the trade volume 
of the country that uses this currency. The weights of the Chinese yuan, the Japanese 
yen and the Korean won will be substantial. This index is expected to help to stabilize 
the fluctuation of the 13 currencies in the region. The ACU is the first step toward a 
single currency in the region. There is a long way to go from the ACU to a single 
currency. It needs the harmonious efforts and cooperation of governments. 
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996) find that the East Asian countries satisfy the 
requirements of an optimum currency area. Larraín and Tavares (2005) find that the 
level of economic integration of the East Asian countries is approaching that of the 
European countries. Bénassy-Quéré (1999) finds that East Asia is still not ready for 
establishing an optimum currency area. Other authors find a few countries in the 
region are ready to form a currency area (Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1994; Huang 
and Guo, 2005; Karras, 2005; Lim, 2005). There is not a consensus whether the East 
Asian countries can form a currency union or not. 
However, political and culture factors play a very important role in conducting 
monetary cooperation like a currency union. Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Philippines and Thailand seem to be quite different from countries like China, Japan, 
and Korea in culture. It is less likely to form a common currency area in countries of 
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different economic environments and political structures. Hong Kong is a special 
administrative area of China. It is unlikely that Hong Kong would join a currency area 
without the co-ordination with the central government of China. It is also unlikely for 
Korea to form a common currency area with some Southeast Asian countries because 
of differences in culture, political and economic structures. It is less likely that all the 
East Asian countries form a common currency area in a reasonable short time period. 
There is still a long way to go for all of the East Asian countries to adopt a single 
currency. Although the East Asian countries have increased financial and trade 
integration through swap agreements and free trade agreements, they have diverse 
economic structures, isolated labor and financial markets, and different levels of 
economic development. Economic divergence makes it difficult for the East Asian 
economies to adopt a uniform monetary policy. Some of the preconditions for 
establishing a common currency area include similar economic structures, common 
cultural backgrounds, and convergence of levels of economic development. 
China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan are important economies in East Asia. They have 
relatively similar cultural backgrounds. They have become more integrated 
economically in recent years. They are major trading partners of each other. Taiwan’s 
economic and trade relationships with China, Japan, and Korea are closer than those 
with the ASEAN countries. Taiwan’s trade with these three countries is more than 
twice that with the ASEAN countries. Both China and Japan are the major trading 
partners of Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan is the third largest investor in China. As 
Taiwan increases its trade and investment in this area, it becomes more closely related 
with China, Japan and Korea, some lingering political agenda notwithstanding. Is it 
possible for them to form a currency union?  
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This paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the background and 
rationales for introducing a currency union in Northeast Asia. Section III provides 
related literature on the issue. Section IV describes our estimation methodology. 
Section V reports a summary of some statistical characteristics of data and results of 
preliminary tests. Section VI reports the empirical results on various options of a 
currency union and an exchange rate union in the region. Section VII provides the 
summary of the paper and conclusion. 
 
1.2 Toward a Currency Union in Northeast Asia: Background and Rationale 
 
At first glance, it does not seem easy for the Northeast Asian economies to form a 
currency area as they are different in the political structure and the current status of 
economic development. Japan is more developed than China, Korea and Taiwan. 
China is a socialistic country with a mixed economy while the others are not. 
Since the 1980s, economic ties between China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan have 
kept increasing trade and capital flows among the four Northeast Asian countries. In 
1991 the Northeast Asia Economic Forum (NEAEF) was created to promote the 
research, networking and dialogue relevant to the economic and social development 
of Northeast Asia. NEAEF conferences and seminars are held each year. The idea of 
the Northeast Asian Development Bank (NEADB) has been discussed since the 
establishment of NEAEF. A special committee for the establishment of the NEADB 
was created in 2000. This can be viewed as the first step toward the monetary 
unification of the Northeast Asian economies. Mutual benefits provide an incentive 
for the Northeast Asian countries to cooperate with each other. 
  There are many studies investigating what economic characteristics the members 
of a common currency area should share (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 
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1969). Some criteria are created for potential candidates of a common currency area. 
The basic characteristic is that members of the common currency area should respond 
symmetrically to common shocks. Other criteria include factor mobility, trade 
openness, similar regional production pattern, high intra-regional trade, among others, 
as discussed below. 
Trade Openness 
China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have chosen the export-oriented economic 
growth strategy for their economic development. This development strategy increases 
the openness of their economies. Fluctuations of exchange rates cause instabilities in 
trade balance and income. The more open is the economy, the more its output is 
affected by changes in the currency value. A common currency helps to stabilize 
exchange rates, and then reduces fluctuations of trade balance and output. Table 1.1 
gives the degree of trade openness of the four Northeast Asian economies.3 It shows 
that Japan is the least open and Korea is the most open. China’s total trade as a 
percentage of GDP increased significantly during the period from 1980 to 2003. In 
1980, the total trade volume of China was only 15% of GDP and in 2003, it increased 
to 66%. China became the second most open country among the four economies after 
Korea (73%) in 2003. The trade openness of Korea and Taiwan fluctuates over time. 
But they are the most open among the four.  
China, Japan, and Korea become more open in recent years through international 
cooperation. China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Since then 
import barriers have dramatically been cut. China’s market becomes more open. 
China, Japan and the ASEAN countries propose to establish the ASEAN-China FTA 
and the ASEAN-Japan FTA within 10 years. Korea and the U.S. started to discuss on 
                                                 
3 Trade openness is defined as the total trade (imports plus exports) as a percentage of GDP. 
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a free trade agreement in early 2006. These efforts improve the openness of the 
Northeast Asian area, and it is expected to increase the benefits from a currency union 
in the region. 
Intra-regional Trade 
Countries can benefit from a common currency by keeping a stable exchange rate 
among its member countries when they have a significant amount of intra-regional 
trade. The East Asian countries experienced a dramatic growth in the intra-regional 
trade since 1980 (Sakakibara and Yamakawa, 2003). Table 1.2 lists the shares of trade 
with the major trading partners for China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The share of 
China in the trade of other economies has increased tremendously over time, 
especially for Taiwan. China is ranked as 27th in 1989 among all the trading partners 
of Taiwan, 12th in 1997. In 2003, China became the third largest trading partner of 
Taiwan after Japan and the U.S.  In 2003, China was the 2nd largest trading partner of 
Japan and Korea after the U.S. The share of Japan in China’ trade first increased and 
then decreased recently; and it kept declining in Korea and Taiwan. The shares of 
Korea in Chin’s and Taiwan’s trade have increased over time. The share of Korea in 
Japan’s trade first declined and then increased. The shares of Taiwan in China’s and 
Korea’s trade have increased over time. The share of Taiwan in Japan’s trade had 
increased from 1991 to 1997, until it declined in 2003. In 2003, the U.S. is the largest 
trading partner of Japan and Korea, and the second largest trading partner of China 
and Taiwan. The Northeast Asian economies still trade a lot with the U.S., but the 
relative share of the U.S. has decreased over time. Japan is the largest trading partner 
of China and Taiwan, and the third largest trading partner of Korea. The intra-regional 
trade has significantly increased over time. For example, the intra-regional trade of 
China has increased from 18 percent to 27 percent since the early 1990s. The intra-
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regional trade of Korea and that of Taiwan have also increased from the 23-26 percent 
level to more than 33 percent during the period of 1991 through 2003. The intra-
regional trade of Japan has increased from 15 percent to 27 percent during the same 
period.  
Although the intra-regional trade has increased over time, the Northeast Asian 
economies still trade a lot with the U.S. and the euro area. Table 1.2 shows, however, 
that the shares of developed countries in the trade of the Northeast Asian economies 
tend to decline. The total trade of China, Korea and Taiwan with Japan has declined. 
But the share of the intra-regional trade in the total trade of Japan has increased 
significantly since early 1990s. The increase in the intra-regional trade among the 
Northeast Asian economies provides a more favorable environment to introduce a 
currency union in the region. 
Factor Mobility 
According to Mundell (1961), with free labor mobility, workers can move to other 
countries when a negative shock hits the domestic country, so that the increase in 
unemployment in the domestic country is relieved. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) 
argue that the requirement of labor mobility is not that important because labor 
mobility even in many developed countries is not high. Labor still cannot move freely 
within the Northeast Asia. The role of the labor mobility on the labor market is 
different. China is a labor-exporting country, while Japan and Taiwan are labor-
importing countries (Huang and Guo, 2005). The number of foreign workers has 
increased in the Northeast Asian region in recent years.  
Another factor that moves among the economies is capital. Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) is an important channel of capital flows.  FDI is essential for 
economic growth of the Northeast Asian economies, especially for China. Thanks to 
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its open-door policy in the late 1970s, China has attracted a large amount of inward 
FDI. China receives a significant portion of FDI inflows through Hong Kong, which 
accounts for more than 30% of FDI inflows into China each year. Another source is 
the U.S. (10%). But the share of inward FDI from the U.S. has been decreasing. 
Taiwan was the third largest source of FDI in the mainland China before 2003, after 
Hong Kong.  Korea took the place of Taiwan in 2003. About one-fifth of all FDI 
inflows to China is intra-regional FDI. The inward FDI of Taiwan mainly comes from 
the U.S. and Japan, about 20% for each country. Intra-regional FDI is essential for 
Taiwan’s economic growth.  
Financial cooperation is active in this area, especially among China, Japan and 
Korea. In the implementation of the CMI swap agreement, China, Japan and Korea 
play very important roles. As of November 2005, more than 80% of the total amount 
of bilateral swap arrangements is provided by the three countries. Figure 1.1 shows 
that the swap arrangements among the three Northeast Asian economies account for 
over one-third of the total arrangements to cover 10 ASEAN nations plus China, 
Korea and Japan.  
Increases in trade and FDI, which are driven by the increase in openness, 
contribute to economic growth in Northeast Asia. Increased intra-regional trade and 
FDI change trading and investment patterns in the region (Sakakibara and Yamakawa, 
2003). Trade and capital shift to developing countries because of lower costs. The 
Northeast Asian economies depend less on the West, especially the U.S. Therefore, 
regional cooperation becomes more important. With the increased openness, intra-
regional trade and capital flows, the Northeast Asian economies can benefit from 
introducing a common currency. By establishing a currency union and applying 
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uniform monetary policy, these economies can stabilize the exchange rate, and reduce 
the fluctuations in trade, capital flows and output. 
Business Cycle Synchronization 
Business cycle synchronization is one of the crucial requirements for member 
countries of a common currency area to introduce a common currency. The cost of 
adopting a single currency will be smaller if the business cycles of member countries 
are synchronized, because a uniform monetary policy can be applied when they 
encounter common shocks (Cheung and Yuen, 2004). Schnabl (2005) finds that the 
business cycle of Korea and that of Taiwan are synchronized because of increasing 
intra-regional trade and similar exchange rate, monetary, and fiscal policies. Cheung 
and Yuen (2004) find that China, Japan and Korea have synchronized business cycles 
in both short-run and long-run. 
Business cycle synchronization is not a sufficient condition for adopting a uniform 
monetary policy. Shocks should also be symmetric across economies. Countries with 
synchronized business cycles should not introduce a uniform monetary policy if they 
experience shocks mainly as country-specific shocks instead of common shocks. Then 
they are not quite eligible to form a currency union. China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan 
have become more open and more integrated in trade and finance since the early 
1990s. Whether shocks are symmetric among the Northeast Asian economies 
determines whether or not they are ready to form a common currency area. If they are 
facing similar shocks, the cost of relinquishing an independent monetary policy will 






1.3 Literature Review 
When a monetary union is formed, there is only one central bank that conducts 
monetary policy for the common currency area. The countries lose autonomous 
monetary policy. They also lose the seigniorage revenue from issuing money. The 
benefits include the reduction of transaction costs, and the stabilization of the 
exchange rate among countries participating in the union, which stimulates intra-
regional trade and reduces trade fluctuations in trade with outsiders. The more open is 
the country, the more benefit it can get from monetary unification, because the 
unification reduces the transaction costs involved in international trade (McKinnon, 
1963). Countries with a high degree of openness are more likely to be a member of a 
currency union. 
According to Mundell (1961), two economies can benefit from monetary 
unification if they favor the same policy reaction when facing the same shock. Kenen 
(1969) suggests that countries with similar industries tend to experience similar 
shocks if shocks are industry-specific and the shocks are then positively correlated. 
One of the focuses of this paper is laid on investigating whether or not the 
macroeconomic shocks in the economies of China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan are 
symmetric. If shocks are symmetric across the regional nations, then they are 
qualified to form a monetary union.  
There are a few studies on the optimum currency area for the Asian countries. 
Bénassy-Quéré (1999) examines the viability of a yen block in Asia by analyzing the 
relationship between the volatility of both nominal and real bilateral exchange rates, 
and output volatility, similarity in exports, and trade share.  Eichengreen and Bayoumi 
(1996) use the similar methodology to investigate whether or not the East Asian 
countries satisfy the optimum currency basket criteria by checking the relationship 
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between the standard deviation of the bilateral exchange rate and output variability, 
export dissimilarity, share of exports, and the relative size of GDP. They estimate the 
volatility of the bilateral exchange rate as an index. Similar results of the index 
measurement across countries imply that they are eligible for an optimal currency area. 
The limitation of this method is that it tends to mix up the effects of different types of 
shocks. 
Karras (2005) investigates whether or not there is an optimum currency area 
among 18 Asian and Pacific countries by examining the costs and benefits of forming 
a common currency area. He examines the correlation of the volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, inflation, and output between the Asian and 
Pacific countries and Japan, using different methods to de-trend the data.  
Some other authors use the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model with 
identification assumptions a la Blanchard and Quah (1989) to investigate whether 
shocks of different countries are correlated (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994; Chow 
and Kim, 2003; Kwack, 2004; Zhang, Sato, and McAleer 2004; Huang and Guo, 
2005). Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) take into account demand and supply shocks 
among 15 European countries, 11 Asian countries, and 13 American countries. Kwack 
(2004) also uses demand and supply shocks for 10 East Asian countries. In addition to 
the symmetry of shocks, he considers trade openness and FDI. Chow and Kim (2003) 
consider global, regional, and domestic supply shocks for 7 East Asian countries. 
However, these studies are quite limited because they examine only demand and 
supply shocks in their analyses. For example, monetary shocks can also make trade 
and output fluctuate. Huang and Guo (2006) choose a four-variable system including 
global supply shocks, domestic supply shocks, demand shocks and monetary shocks 
for 9 East Asia countries. Zhang, Sato, and McAleer (2004) examine the correlation 
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of supply, demand, and monetary shocks for the U.S. and 9 East Asian economies. 
For the East Asian countries, exports are very important. Most of these countries are 
export-dependent. So exchange rate shocks should be taken into account for the East 
Asian case. So in this paper, supply shocks, demand shocks, monetary shocks and 
exchange rate shocks are considered. 
Several recent studies of the possibility of an optimum currency area in Asia focus 
on East Asia. The findings of the studies are mixed. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) 
suggest two common currency areas for East Asia, a Northeast Asian bloc including 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and a Southeast Asian bloc including Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and possibly Thailand. Their study does not include China. 
Karras (2005) finds that Korea along with Indonesia is a promising candidate for the 
yen bloc based on analysis of costs and benefits. He does not examine the symmetry 
of shocks across counties. Huang and Guo (2006) propose a currency union including 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Taiwan is not 
included in the analysis. Lim (2005) finds that Hong Kong, Korea, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand can form a currency union. His study does not include China. 
Kwack (2004) and Chow and Kim (2003) find that there is not a common currency 
area in East Asia. Kwack (2004) only examines demand and supply shocks. Chow 
and Kim (2003) do not include China in their study.   
It is still not clear whether shocks are symmetric among China, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan, and whether or not they are eligible for a currency union. This paper attempts 
to investigate the possibility of establishing a currency union like the Euro area in 
Northeast Asia including China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The SVAR model is used 
to examine the correlation of domestic supply, demand, monetary and exchange rate 




Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) construct their structural vector autoregression 
(SVAR) model on the basis of an AD-AS framework. They assume that in the long-
run, output is affected only by supply shocks. Demand shocks have no long-run effect 
on output. Huang and Guo (2006) extend this model by including external supply 
shocks and monetary shocks and they assume that monetary shocks do not affect the 
real exchange rate or output in the long-run.  In this section, we extend the framework 
of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) from a two-variable model to a four-variable 
model by incorporating exchange rate shocks and monetary shocks. For different 
choice of variables and shocks, see Table 1.12. The Northeast Asian economies are 
export-oriented economies. Changes in exchange rate provide significant impact on 
output in these economies by affecting imports and exports. It determines the 
competitiveness of their products. Monetary shocks are also important. If monetary 
shocks are symmetric across economies, they can adopt a uniform monetary policy 
with smaller costs. A common currency area will be a favorable option for them. 
In this paper, the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model is used. The 
Northeast Asian economies can be described using the following moving-average 
representation of the SVAR model. 
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where .  is the logarithm of output;  is the 
logarithm of the nominal exchange rate;  is the logarithm of nominal money;  is 
the logarithm of foreign prices; and  is the logarithm of domestic prices.  







ttt ppe −+ ∗  is the real effective exchange rate. tt pm −  is the logarithm of real 
money balance.  is a vector of unobserved shocks. is a supply 
shock; is an exchange rate shock;  is a monetary shock; and  is a demand 














Equation (1) can be rewritten in matrix form,  
 








































































)(LA  is a coefficient matrix representing the impulse response of output, the real 
effective exchange rate, real money balance, and inflation to various shocks. L is a lag 
operator. 
Following Blabchard and Quah (1989), the following identifying restrictions are 
imposed to fully identify the model. 
(1) The demand shock, monetary shock and exchange rate shock do not affect 




















 (2) The real effective exchange rate is not affected by the monetary shock or 
























Therefore, Equation (2) becomes 
 








































































This model is estimated using the procedure proposed by Blanchard and Quah 
(1989). A reduced-form vector autoregression (VAR) for x∆  is estimated to obtain  
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where are residuals of the reduced-form VAR equation;  is a coefficient 
matrix and .  To get equation (2'), residuals  must be transformed into 
shocks, . The relationship between the unobserved shocks of the SVAR model and 
the residual of the reduced-form VAR model can be derived from equation (1) and (3), 










Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), the correlation coefficients between 
shocks across economies are calculated. If the shocks are correlated across the 
economies, they are viewed as symmetric. If they are not correlated, the shocks are 







We use annual data for the four Northeast Asian economies during the period 
from 1970 to 2004 in this paper.4 Data on China, Japan, Korea, the U.S. and countries 
of the Euro area5 are obtained from different databases. Real GDP, CPI,6 and M2 are 
taken from the Development Indicator of the World Bank. The exchange rate data are 
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Trade data are collected from Direction of Trade Statistics of IMF. Data of 
Taiwan are obtained from various websites of local statistical authorities.7  Variables 
of the Euro area before 1999 are estimated as the weighted average of all 12 countries. 
The weight is the average share of their GDP for the period from 1970-2004. 
We calculate the real effective exchange in the following way. First, the nominal 
exchange rates of each country are transformed into real exchange rates using the CPI 
of both countries. The real effective exchange rate is the geometric average of the real 
exchange rate of domestic currency against the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen and the 
euro. The weight is the average shares of trade for the period of 1990-2003.8 The 
shares of each currency for the four economies are listed in Table 1.3. Table 1.3 
shows that the U.S. dollar has the highest weight for Japan (70%), Korea (43%) and 
Taiwan (42%). The Japanese yen has the highest weight for China (40%). Figure 1.2 
shows the real effective exchange rate (year 2000=100). In the long-run, the real 
effective exchange rates of China, Korea, and Taiwan tend to increase, while the real 
effective exchange rates of Japan are shown to have decreased. 
                                                 
4 Data of China covers the period from 1977 to 2004. 
5 The Euro area countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
6 For China and Germany, there are no data for CPI. GDP deflator is used instead. 
7 GDP, CPI, and the exchange rate are downloaded from http://eng.stat.gov.tw; data of money 
aggregates from http://www.cbc.gov.tw; and data of international trade from http://cus93.trade.gov.tw. 
8 For Korea, it is the average shares of trade for two periods, 1990-1993 and 1997-2003, because of 
missing data for 1994-1996. 
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Before estimating the model, unit root tests9 are conducted to check whether or 
not the variables are of unit-root processes or non-stationary. All of the series are 
shown to be non-stationary in levels except the CPI of Japan, which is stationary. The 
logarithms of most series are non-stationary except for the logarithms of real GDP for 
Japan and Taiwan, and those of the CPI for Korea and Taiwan. Then, all data are 
transformed into the log-difference form to de-trend. The log differences of real GDP, 
the real effective exchange rate, and real money balance are stationary at the 5% level. 
The log differences of CPI for China, Japan, and Taiwan are stationary at the 10% 
level. The log differences of the CPI for Korea are not stationary.  
Table 1.4 reports the mean and standard deviation of changes of the variables. 
Economic growth, real effective exchange rate changes, real money balance growth, 
and inflation are expressed as the changes in the logarithms of real GDP, real 
effective exchange rate, real money balance and CPI. The mean of real GDP growth 
shows that China enjoys the highest economic growth among the four economies, and 
the growth rate of Japan is the lowest. The standard deviation suggests that China and 
Japan have more stable growth than Korea and Taiwan. The real effective exchange 
rate of China has increased the fastest, which means that the Chinese yuan has 
depreciated faster than the other currencies during the sample period. The average rate 
of changes in Japan’s real effective exchange rate is negative. This implies that  the 
Japanese yen appreciated during the sample period, which is different from the other 
three currencies.  The standard deviation indicates that the currency value of the 
Japanese yen and the new Taiwan dollar is more stable than that of the Chinese yuan 
and the Korean won. The average real money growth rate is the highest in China and 
the lowest in Japan. Taiwan exhibits more volatile real money supply than China, 
                                                 
9 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are used. 
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Japan, and Korea. The average rate of inflation of Korea is much higher than those of 
the other three economies. The standard deviation shows that the price level of 
Taiwan is less stable than that of China, Japan and Korea. 
Table 1.5a-1.5d reports the correlation coefficients of real GDP growth, changes 
in the real effective exchange rate, real money balance growth, and inflation rates 
among the four Northeast Asian economies. Japan, Korea and Taiwan display high 
correlations in growth rates. The real growth rate of China is relatively separated from 
this group. It is only correlated with that of Taiwan. The real effective exchange rates 
of the four economies are relatively idiosyncratic. Only China and Taiwan are 
correlated. For real money balance, Japan, Korea and Taiwan are highly correlated 
with each other, while China seems to be independent of them. Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan also exhibit high correlation coefficients in inflation rates. This preliminary 
result indicates that Japan, Korea and Taiwan have a potential to form an optimal 
currency area. Whether or not they are ready for a currency union depends on the 
nature and degree of symmetry between the same-category shocks across countries. 
 
1.6 Empirical Results 
1.6.1 Currency union 
Importance of Shocks  
First, the structure of various shocks is examined. The ultimate purpose of 
forming a currency union is to stabilize economic growth in the common currency 
area. The shocks that can explain the most variances of real GDP growth are 
considered to be more important than other shocks. If shocks affecting real GDP 
growth are the same for all the economies, the adoption of a uniform policy can 
stabilize the economic growth of all the economies. If shocks affecting real GDP 
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growth are different, a uniform policy may not stabilize economic growth of all the 
economies in the region. We apply variance decomposition analysis to check the 
similarity of the shocks that can significantly affect real GDP growth for the four 
Northeast Asian economies. The results are listed in Table 1.6.  
Supply shocks are shown to explain most of forecast error variances of real GDP 
growth of China (80%). For China, supply shocks are the most important in 
stabilizing fluctuations in real GDP growth. Both exports and imports of China grow 
fast. The finding that supply shocks are important for China is consistent with the fact 
that China has become a manufacturing center and a successful export-oriented 
economy. Exports are important for real GDP growth.  
For Japan, demand shocks are the most important in the short-run, which can 
explain 56% of the forecast error variance of real GDP growth. In the long-run, both 
supply and demand shocks are important. They can explain more than 70% of forecast 
error variances. In the short-run, demand shocks are the main disturbances that affect 
growth. High-tech products account for a larger part of exports in Japan. Supply 
shocks are shown to affect growth in the long-run. 
In the short-run, monetary shocks can explain more than 50% of forecast error 
variances for Korea. In the long-run, both monetary shocks and demand shocks are 
most important in Korea. Each of the two shocks can explain more than 30% of the 
forecast error variance of real GDP growth.  
For Taiwan, both demand and supply shocks are important in the short-run. In the 
long-run, however, supply shocks are the most important, which can explain more 
than 50% of the forecast error variance. This reflects Taiwan as one of the fast-
growing economies with the solid industrial base in the region.  
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Variance decomposition analysis shows that the types of shocks that affect real 
GDP growth are very different among the four economies. A uniform monetary 
policy may not be able to stabilize fluctuations in real GDP growth for all the 
Northeast Asian economies.  
Adjustment Processes to Shocks 
We use impulse response analysis is used to investigate the adjustment processes 
of the macroeconomic variables in response to different shocks in each of the four 
Northeast Asian economies. If the responses to shocks are similar across economies, 
then the adjustment process of these economies to different types of shocks are 
similar. Then a uniform policy may be introduced to all the economies. Figure 1.3a-
1.3d show the results of impulse response function analysis.  
It is found that positive supply shocks improve real GDP growth in the short-run, 
but the effect dissipates over time. Supply shocks increase China’s real GDP growth 
more than those of the other three economies because supply shocks turn out to be the 
most important shocks for economic growth. Supply shocks have similar effects on 
the real GDP growth of Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The effects of demand shocks and 
exchange rate shocks on real GDP growth of China are also different from those on 
the real GDP growth of Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The responses to real GDP growth 
to monetary shocks are similar across the four economies. The adjustment processes 
of real GDP growth to different types of shocks are similar among Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan. The adjustment processes of China are different. 
The responses of the real effective exchange rate of Korea and Taiwan to supply 
shocks are similar. The reactions of China or Japan are different. There some 
similarities in responses of the real effective exchange rate to the exchange rate shock, 
the monetary shock and the demand shock among China, Japan and Taiwan. The 
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responses of the real effective exchange rate of Korea are different. It turns out that 
the adjustment processes of the real effective exchange rate to various shocks are 
different among the four economies. 
The responses of real money balance to supply shock are similar among the four 
economies. There are some similarities in the reactions of real money balance to 
exchange rate shocks of Japan and Taiwan. The responses of China or Korea are 
different. The responses of real money balance to monetary shocks and demand 
shocks are similar among Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The adjustment processes of real 
money balance to different shocks are not similar among the Northeast Asian 
economies. 
The responses of inflation to the supply shock are similar for the China-Korea pair 
and the Japan-Taiwan pair. There are some similarities in responses of inflation of the 
four Northeast Asian economies to the exchange rate shock and the demand shock. 
The reactions of inflation to the monetary shock are similar among Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan. China is different from the other three economies. It is found that there are 
some similarities among Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Overall, the adjustment processes 
of inflation to various shocks are not similar among the four economies. 
Impulse response analysis shows that the response of real GDP growth, changes in 
the real effective exchange rate, real money balance, and inflation to various shocks 
turns out to be quite different across the four Northeast Asian economies although 
there have some similarities. The adjustment processes to various shocks are not 
similar for the four Northeast Asian economies, which indicates that the economic 
structure and the adjustment processes to different types of macroeconomic shocks 
lack similarities among the Northeast Asian economies.  
Correlation of Shocks 
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To investigate whether or not China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan can form a 
currency union like the Euro area, we estimate various shocks using the SVAR model. 
We choose one lag for all of the four economies, since the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz criterion (SC) indicate that one lag is optimal for all 
the economies except China.  
To examine the degree of symmetry of shocks, we estimated the correlation 
coefficients of each individual shock among the Northeast Asian economies. If the 
correlation coefficients are significant and positive, the shocks are considered to be 
symmetric between the two economies. If the correlation coefficient is negative or 
insignificant, the shock is viewed as asymmetric. Tables 1.7a-1.7d report the 
correlation coefficients of supply shocks, exchange rate shocks, monetary shocks, and 
demand shocks, respectively. 
Table 1.7a reports the correlation coefficients of supply shocks among the four 
economies. The supply shocks are positively and significantly correlated between 
Korea and Taiwan. The correlation coefficient between Japan and Taiwan is also 
positive and statistically significant. The correlation coefficient between China and 
Japan is significant but negative. There is no other significant correlation. Supply 
shocks are not symmetric among the four economies. Since a supply shock is 
invariant to monetary and fiscal policies, it is considered to be more informative than 
other shocks (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1994). Supply shocks of the euro area are 
highly correlated (Huang and Guo, 2006).  Although the correlation coefficient 
between Japan and Korea is not significant, it is positive and the coefficient is close to 
that of the Japan-Korean pair and the Korea-Taiwan pair. We see an evidence that 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have the potential to for a currency union in the long-run. 
China is negatively correlated with Japan and Korea, and is not correlated with 
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Taiwan. China seems to be an outlier from the group in the correlation of supply 
shocks. 
Table 1.7b reports the correlation coefficients of exchange rate shocks between 
different pairs of the Northeast Asian economies. Only the correlation coefficient 
between China and Taiwan is significant and positive. There is no significant 
correlation coefficient among Japan, Korea and China, or among Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan. Exchange rate shocks are not symmetric among these economies. This may 
be caused by differences in the exchange rate regime. The Chinese yuan had been 
pegged to the U.S. dollar since 199410 until July 2005 when the fixed exchange rate 
system was changed to a managed floating exchange rate system; Japan has adopted a 
free floating exchange rate regime; Korea switched from managed floating to a free 
floating regime in December 1997; and Taiwan changed its exchange rate system to a 
floating rate system in 1989.  
Table 1.7c displays the cross correlation coefficients of monetary shocks. The 
results do not indicate any significant and positive correlations among these 
economies. Monetary shocks are not symmetric among China, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan. Although these economies become more integrated, none of them has the 
leading role in the Northeast Asian capital market.  
Table 1.7d shows the correlation coefficients of demand shocks.  Japan and 
Taiwan display a positive and significant correlation coefficient. The correlation 
between China and Japan is also significant, but it is negative. There are no other 
significant correlations among these economies. Demand shocks include the effects of 
fiscal and monetary policies, and they are less reliable then supply shocks (Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen 1994).   
                                                 
10 China switched to a currency basket in July 2005. 
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So supply shocks are symmetric between Japan and Taiwan, and between Korea 
and Taiwan. Exchange rate shocks are symmetric between China and Taiwan. 
Monetary shocks are not symmetric among the four economies. Demand shocks are 
symmetric only between Japan and Taiwan. The results suggest that there is no 
combination of the four economies that have all four shocks symmetric among them.  
Variance decomposition analysis indicates that shocks that impact the fluctuations 
in real GDP growth are somewhat different for the four Northeast Asian economies. 
The adoption of a uniform monetary policy is not expected to stabilize economic 
growth for all the Northeast Asian economies. Impulse response analysis suggests that 
the adjustment processes to different shocks are not similar for the four economies. 
Economic structures, especially shocks adjustment mechanisms, are different for all 
four economies. The correlation analysis of various shocks suggests that the four 
economies are not ready to form a currency union, because there is not a group of 
economies within which all underlying shocks are symmetric.  
The economic structures of these economies are still different. Although China 
developed rapidly after the 1990s, China is not as developed as Japan, and Korea. As 
an emerging market, China’s market is still subject to some intervention by the 
government. China’s currency value is also under the control of its central bank. The 
Chinese yuan was pegged to the U.S. dollar until July 2005. Now the Chinese yuan is 
pegged to a currency basket containing the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the euro, the 
Korean won and other currencies. Japan, Korea and Taiwan adopt a flexible exchange 
rate regime. These facts seem to be some of the main reasons why China and the other 
three economies are subject to asymmetric shocks. Another reason is Taiwan. China, 
Japan and Korea become more integrated through economic cooperation 
organizations like CMI, NEAEF and free trade agreements with the ASEAN countries. 
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Taiwan is not a member of any of these organizations. It is trade and FDI that link 
Taiwan with the other three economies. This limits the cooperation among these four 
economies. Statistical analysis and the condition of these economies imply that even 
if China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan become more integrated (Zhang and Sato, 2005; 
Cheung and Yuen, 2004), it seems that the Northeast Asian economies are not ready 
yet to form a currency union. 
The purpose of monetary cooperation is to reduce exchange rate fluctuations 
within the area and with the rest of the world (Eichengreen, 2006). Although it is still 
not the right time for Northeast Asia to adopt a common currency, there is another 
option for monetary cooperation among these economies, which is an exchange rate 
union. Under the exchange rate union, all currencies will be pegged to the same 
currency or a common currency basket (currency index). An example of an exchange 
rate union is the European Currency Unit (ECU). By forming an exchange rate union, 
the currency value is kept relatively stable within this area. They can keep their own 
currency although they still sacrifice some independence in monetary policy. An 
exchange rate union can reduce fluctuations in the currency value, trade volume and 
real GDP growth, although it is not as effective as a currency union because the 
supply of money is still determined by the central bank of each individual economy. 
When the currency index is generally accepted and used in accounting, transactions, 
and financial instruments, it can be developed into a single currency. An exchange 
rate union can be viewed as a preliminary stage of a currency union. 
Sub-sample Analysis 
The financial crisis of 1997 had a substantial impact on the East Asian economies. 
To examine whether the financial crisis affect the result of this study, the structural 
VAR model is applied to the period before 1997. The result is shown in Table 1.13a-d. 
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Before the crisis, supply shocks of Japan and Taiwan are positively and 
significantly correlated. The coefficient is higher than that of the whole sample. For 
the whole sample, supply shocks of Korea and Taiwan are also correlated. The 
correlation coefficient between China and Taiwan is smaller than that of the whole 
sample. So after the crisis, Taiwan became more correlated with China and Korea. 
This is because Taiwan increased trade with China and Korea. The increase in the 
coefficient between Japan and Korea and that between Korea and Taiwan indicates 
that Korea became more correlated with Japan and Taiwan after the crisis. 
There is no significant correlation of exchange rate shocks before the crisis. For 
the whole sample, exchange rate shocks of China and Taiwan are correlated. This 
change is also because of the increase in trade between China and Taiwan after the 
crisis. The share of China in the trade of Taiwan increases from 2% in 1997 to 12% in 
2003.  
There is no positive and significant correlation of monetary shocks. This result is 
similar to that of the whole sample. The coefficients of the whole sample for China, 
Japan, and Korea are larger than those of the sub-sample. The improvement of 
financial cooperation among the three countries after the crisis may be one reason for 
this change. 
For demand shocks, only Korea and Taiwan are positively and significantly 
correlated. For the whole sample study, Japan and Taiwan are correlated. After the 
crisis, demand shocks of Taiwan are more correlated with those of Japan and less 
correlated with Korea.  
The comparison of the whole sample and the sub-sample shows that after the 
crisis the improvement in trade and financial cooperation increase the correlation 
among the Northeast Asian economies in some aspects.   
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1.6.2 Exchange rate union 
For an exchange rate union, there are several options for the choice of an anchor 
currency − a single currency or a currency basket, or internal currencies, or external 
currencies. If a currency or a currency basket is found for these economies, they can 
form an exchange rate union by jointly pegging to this currency anchor. To 
investigate whether the currencies of China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan can be pegged 
to the same currency or a common currency basket, we use the SVAR model: 
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output;  is the log difference of the foreign real money balance;  is the log 
difference of the foreign price level; 
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It is assumed that domestic shocks do not affect foreign variables, since these 
economies are small compared with the global and regional economies. It is also 
assumed that the demand shock and monetary shock do not affect output in the long-
run, and that the demand shock does not affect real money balance in the long-run. 





































Following Chow and Kim (2003) and Kim and Sun (2005), we use forecast error 
variance decomposition to measure the degree of symmetry of shocks between each 
economy and its anchor currency. If shocks from foreign countries can explain more 
forecast error variance in real GDP growth, then the domestic currency should be 
pegged to the anchor currency or a common currency basket. If domestic shocks are 
dominant, then its currency should not be pegged to the anchor currency or a common 
currency basket. 
Single Currency Peg 
First, we investigate the possibility of pegging to a single currency. Since the 
Northeast Asian economies mainly trade with the U.S. and Japan, the U.S. dollar and 
the Japanese yen are chosen as possible anchor currencies. The results of variance 
decomposition are presented in Table 1.8 and 1.9. 
Table 1.8 shows the results of variance decomposition when the U.S. dollar is the 
anchor currency. For China, the U.S. supply shock, monetary shock and demand 
shock can explain more than 50% of forecast error variances of real GDP growth in 
both short-run and long-run. The forecast error variances of Japan and Korea are 
mainly explained by domestic specific shocks. For Taiwan, forecast error variances of 
real GDP growth are mainly explained by shocks from the U.S. instead of domestic 
shocks. The higher explanatory power of foreign shocks implies a higher probability 
of pegging the domestic currency to the foreign currency. Variance decomposition 
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analysis indicates that the Chinese yuan and the new Taiwan dollar can be pegged to 
the U.S. dollar, while the Japanese yen and Korean won may not be pegged to the U.S. 
dollar. Thus the U.S. dollar turns out not to be a currency anchor for the exchange rate 
union. 
Table 1.9 reports the results of variance decomposition when the Japanese yen is 
chosen as the anchor. Shocks from Japan can explain most of forecast error variances 
of China and Taiwan. The forecast error variance is mainly explained by domestic 
specific shocks. So the Chinese yuan and the new Taiwan dollar can be pegged to the 
Japanese yen, while the Korean won should not be pegged. 
China and Taiwan can peg their currenies to both major currencies. But Korea and 
Japan cannot peg to either of the currencies. It turns out that none of the two major 
currencies can be chosen as a currency anchor for the potential exchange rate union 
including all four economies. A single currency peg does not seem to be a feasible 
choice for these economies. 
On the other hand, pegging to a single currency may be risky. The experience of 
the crisis of 1997 shows that the fluctuations in the yen-dollar rate causes instability in 
the trade balance of Japan’s competitors that peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar. 
The Chinese yuan was pegged to the U.S. dollar and switched to a currency-basket 
peg in 2005. The reality indicates that a single currency peg is not a good choice for 
the four economies. Since neither the U.S. dollar nor the Japanese yen turns out to be 
an option for an anchor currency for the Northeast Asian economies, we examine 
whether a currency basket needs is a reasonable option for an anchor currency or not. 
Regional Currency Basket 
The ADB plans introduce the ACU in 2006. Like the European Currency Unit 
(ECU), the ACU is also a basket of regional currencies, and it provides a benchmark 
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for participating countries to stabilize their currency values. The ECU was first 
adopted as a unit of account, while the ACU will be used as an indicator of the 
stability of the regional currencies. Unlike the ECU, it is not likely that the ACU will 
be used in transactions in the near future. However, the introduction of the ACU helps 
to stabilize the exchange rate and promote intra-regional trade and investment. Based 
on the idea of the ECU and the ACU, a currency basket containing all four regional 
currencies, the Chinese yuan, the Japanese yen, the Korean won, and the new Taiwan 
dollar, can be considered as an anchor currency.  
We use a simple VAR model for China, Korea and Taiwan. For Japan, the Vector 
Error Correction (VEC) model is used because all of the series are I(1) and there are 
cointegration relationships among the series. The sample period is from 1977 to 2005. 
The variables of the currency basket are constructed by the geometric averages of the 
variables of all four economies. The weight is the relative size of the economy, which 
is the share of real GDP11. If the share of real GDP of the economy is high, the 
economy is important in this area and it can affect the other economies. So it deserves 
a higher weight in the currency basket. 
The results of variance decomposition are reported in Table 1.10. The forecast 
error variance of China is mainly explained by the domestic shock in the short-run. In 
the long run, regional shocks explain most of the forecast error variance. For Japan, 
the forecast error variance is mainly explained by regional shocks. Regional shocks 
also explain most of the forecast error variance of Korea. The forecast error variance 
of Taiwan is mainly explained by domestic shocks. But the percentage explained by 
domestic shocks (56%) and that explained by regional shocks (44%) are very close, 
                                                 
11 The share of each currency is as follows: the Chinese yen 11.2%, the Japanese yen 79.2%, the 
Korean won 6.1%, and the new Taiwan dollar 3.5%. 
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and the percentage explained by regional shocks is increasing over time. So in the 
long-run, the new Taiwan dollar can be pegged to the regional currency basket. 
Variance decomposition analysis shows that the currencies of all four economies 
can be pegged to the regional currency basket in the long-run. So the regional 
currency basket can be used as the anchor for the exchange rate union in the region. 
For the common currency basket to be effective, a system like the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) should be established. It is unlikely that such a 
system can be established in the near future. So the economies are not forced to 
respond when their currency value deviates from the benchmark, which means that in 
practice, it is not feasible to adopt a regional currency basket before a system like the 
ERM is established.  
Major External Currency Basket 
The U.S. dollar is still the most-used invoicing currency in international trade in 
East Asia. At the same time, the Northeast Asian economies trade a lot with the U.S., 
Japan and the euro Area. The fluctuation of exchange rates against these currencies 
can significantly affect their exports and imports. A major currency basket containing 
the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro can also serve as an anchor currency. 
The variables of the currency basket are calculated as the geometric average of the 
variables from the three economies. The weight is the share of trade with all four 
economies for two periods, 1990-1993 and 1997-200312. 
The SVAR model13 is used for China, Korea, and Taiwan. For Japan, a simple 
VAR model is used since the assumption that domestic variables do not affect foreign 
variables does not hold for Japan.  
                                                 
12 Data for 1994-1996 are dropped because of missing data. The share of the U.S. is 52.2%; the share of 
the Japanese yen is 21.4%; and the share of the Euro is 26.4%. 
13 Only supply shocks and demand shocks are examined, because the data of M2 for European 
countries are not available. 
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The results are reported in Table 1.11. For all four economies, the forecast error 
variance is mainly explained by domestic shocks in the short-run. The shares 
explained by domestic shocks and that are explained by foreign shocks are quite 
similar. The shares explained by foreign shocks increase over time. In the long-run, 
forecast error variances of Japan and Taiwan are mainly explained by foreign shocks, 
while those of China and Korea are mainly explained by domestic shocks. But the 
share of domestic shocks and that of foreign shocks are nearly half and half.  
The variance decomposition indicates that the four economies will not be worse 
off if they peg to the currency basket containing major external currencies. Pegging to 
this currency basket helps to stabilize the currency value within the exchange rate 
union, and exchange rates against currencies of the major trading partners. So the 
currency basket of the major external currencies is expected to promote both intra-
regional trade and trade with countries outside this area. 
Compared with the local currency basket, the major currency basket has the 
advantage that it can reduce fluctuations of both exchange rates among the four 
currencies and the exchange rates of the four currencies against major trading partners. 
The central banks of the four economies should hold additional foreign reserves in the 
currencies of the currency basket, no matter which currency basket they choose 
(Eichengreen, 2006). If they peg to a regional currency basket, they have to hold 
foreign reserves in the other three currencies. Neither of them is the major currency in 
foreign reserves, especially the Chinese yuan, the Korean won, and the new Taiwan 
dollar. Before adopting the local currency basket, they have to enhance the 
convertibility and respectability of their currencies. For the present, the major 
currency basket seems to be a more suitable option for this exchange rate union 
among the Northeast Asian economies. In the long-run, with the increases in intra-
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regional trade and a more integrated economy, a regional currency basket should 
become a better choice.  
 
1.6.3 Comparison with other studies 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan have a long-run potential to form a currency union. This 
result is similar to that of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). In this study the 
correlation coefficient of supply shocks between Japan and Taiwan is 0.33, that 
between Korea and Taiwan is 0.41, and that between Japan and Korea is 0.20 which is 
not very significant. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) find that in Europe, Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland can form a currency 
union (Table 1.12). The minimum correlation coefficient is 0.37 (Belgium and 
Denmark) and the maximum is 0.68 (Denmark and Germany). The coefficients are 
higher than those of the Northeast Asian economies. They also find that in Southeast 
Asia Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore can form a currency union. The 
coefficients range from 0.46 (Japan and Korea) to 0.71 (Malaysia and Singapore), 
which are also much higher than those of the Northeast Asian economies. For the 
demand shock, Japan, Korea and Taiwan are not correlated with each other. We find 
that Japan and Taiwan are correlated only in demand shock and supply shock.  
Kwack (2004) finds that demand shocks of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan and supply 
shocks of Korea and Japan are correlated. His result is different from that of this study. 
In this study, demand shocks of Japan and Taiwan, and supply shocks of Japan and 
Taiwan, and Korea and Taiwan are correlated. For some ASEAN countries, namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are correlated with both supply shocks and demand 
shocks. Kwack (2004) examine only supply shocks and demand shocks.  
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Zhang, Sato, and McAleer (2004) take into account demand, supply and monetary 
shocks. They calculate the correlation of supply shocks and demand shocks for the 
East Asia and the European economies. The correlation coefficients of supply shocks 
range from 0.24 (Switzerland and Portugal) to 0.5 (Belgium and France). Although 
the correlation coefficients of supply shocks for Europe are larger than those of 
Northeast Asia, supply shocks are not correlated for all the countries of the euro area. 
For East Asia, the correlation coefficients are about 0.3, similar to those of Northeast 
Asia. They find that Japan, the leading economy, is not significantly correlated with 
other East Asian economies in the demand shock. For Europe, neither demand shocks 
nor monetary shocks are correlated among all the economies. For both regions, 
monetary shocks are less symmetric than demand shocks. We find that there are no 
significant correlations in monetary shocks, and only Japan and Taiwan are correlated 
in demand shocks. The results are similar. 
Huang and Guo (2006) consider global supply shocks, domestic supply shocks, 
demand shocks and monetary shocks. They find that supply shocks of 9 countries in 
Europe are highly correlated, except those of Finland and Portugal, and those of Italy 
and Portugal. Supply shocks of East Asia are correlated among Hong Kong, Korea, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Supply shocks are more symmetric in 
the euro area. The correlation coefficients of both regions are higher than those of this 
study. They find that demand shocks of the ASEAN countries are highly correlated, 
Korea is correlated with the ASEAN countries, and China and Japan are not 
correlated with other countries. Only 5 European countries are correlated in demand 
shocks. For the monetary shock, they find that the ASEAN countries are correlated 
with each other, Japan is correlated with the ASEAN countries and Korea, and not all 
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European countries are correlated. We did not find any significant correlations in the 
monetary shock among the Northeast Asian economies. 
The comparison of literature shows that supply shocks in the euro zone are more 
symmetric than those in Northeast Asia.  It is also found that the shocks are not 
symmetric for all the countries in the euro area. Figure 1.4 indicates that real GDP 
growth, changes in the real effective exchange rate, growth of real money balance, 
and inflation of the four economies tend to converge over time. When the Northeast 
Asian economies become more symmetric, it is still possible to form a currency union. 
 
1. 7 Conclusion 
Although several studies have found that certain combinations of the East Asian 
countries are eligible for common currency area, these combinations contain both the 
Northeast Asian economies and the ASEAN countries. It is unlikely that these 
countries will form a common currency area and adopt uniform monetary policies 
because of divergence in the political environment, economic standards and cultural 
background. China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are the major economies of Northeast 
Asia. They have significantly increased economic and financial linkages among them 
in recent years with relatively similar cultural background, certain ongoing political 
agenda notwithstanding. It seems to be more feasible for these economies to form a 
currency union than all other Southeastern Asian countries.  
We apply SVAR model with proper identification assumptions to investigate the 
possibility of a currency union among the Northeast Asian economies. Variance 
decomposition indicates that the fluctuations of real GDP growth of the four 
economies are affected by different shocks. Impulse response analysis suggests that 
the adjustment processes to various shocks are different across economies. The 
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analysis of the correlation of supply, exchange rate, monetary, and demand shocks 
shows that shocks of these economies are not symmetric. These imply that Northeast 
Asia is not ready to form a common currency union. Japan, Taiwan and Korea have 
the potential to form a currency union in the long-run. China is still separated from 
this group because its economic structure and the shock adjustment mechanism turn 
out to be quite different from those in the other three economies.  
Although Northeast Asia is not a common currency area, China, Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan can form an exchange rate union, where each economy still has its own 
currency and all of the currencies are pegged to the same anchor currency or currency 
basket. Variance decomposition analysis suggests that both the regional currency 
basket containing all four currencies and the major currency basket can be adopted as 
the anchor for the exchange rate union. The major currency basket should be a better 
choice for the short-run because it can stabilize both exchange rates within the area 
and exchange rates with trading partners. It is also because regional currencies are not 
attractive enough to be foreign reserve currencies. But with an increase in intra-
regional trade, a regional currency basket will be more suitable in the long-run.  
An exchange rate union is only an intermediate stage. As the Northeast Asian 
economies become more integrated, the regional currency basket can serve as a 
currency unit for the area, similar to the ECU. The Northeast Asian economies have 
taken efforts to achieve this goal. The possibility of establishing NEADB and the 
Northeast Asia Free Trade area are currently discussed. They improve cooperation in 
both economic and social aspects through NEAEF and agreements with the ASEAN. 
When the area has a fully integrated goods market, financial market, labor market, 
and more similar economic structure, the regional currency unit can develop into a 
single common currency. In that stage, the four Northeast Asian economies will give 
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up their independent monetary policies and a central bank for the area would be 
established. The Northeast Asian Economies need to enhance the macroeconomic 
convergence and increase financial and monetary cooperation before they reach the 
stage of introducing a currency union in the region. 
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CHAPTER 2: BALANCE SHEETS AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES:  
    ESTIMATING THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past decades foreign currency liabilities and currency mismatches on 
domestic agents’ balance sheets have become a defining characteristic of the 
emerging markets of Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia. At the same time, 
more countries that claim to have a flexible exchange rate are instead floating with a 
lifejacket, that is, they use their international reserves and interest rates to manage 
their exchange rates. Several papers have documented the high variability of the 
international reserves and interest rates relative to that of the exchange rate, also 
called fear of floating (e.g. Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, Hausmann et al., 2001, and 
more recently Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005). These studies suggest that 
liability dollarization (debt denominated in foreign currencies) and currency 
mismatches are possible causes of fear of floating. When domestic agents have 
foreign currency-denominated debt, but their returns are in domestic currency, a 
depreciation of the domestic currency will adversely affect their balance sheets by 
increasing the relative value of debt to assets. This rise in debt to assets could further 
trigger defaults and financial instability. The central bank might want to limit 
fluctuations of the exchange rate to reduce the adverse effects on partially dollarized 
balance sheets. 
Many theoretical studies incorporate liability dollarization and currency 
mismatches in the study of the choice and the effects of monetary and exchange rate 
policy. Moron and Winkelried (2005) examine alternative monetary policy rules for 
economies with different degrees of international liability dollarization, and find the 
defense of real exchange rate optimal in a highly dollarized economy. Similarly, Cook 
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(2004) shows that fixed exchange rate regimes offer more stability to an economy 
with high international liability dollarization.  Fernadez-Arias and Talvi (1999) 
present a model where the government chooses the mode of adjustment to external 
shocks in order to minimize the adverse impact of a deflationary shock on corporate 
balance sheets. 
Other studies then examine the effectiveness and transmission channels of 
monetary policy in the presence of balance sheet effects (e.g., Aghion et al., 2004, and 
Cespedes at al., 2004). 
All these studies assume exogenous mismatches and further study the choice and 
effectiveness of alternative monetary and exchange rate arrangements. But when agents 
make portfolio allocations, they form expectations about future exchange rates. If they 
expect exchange rates to be stable, they are more likely to borrow in foreign currencies 
without hedging their currency exposure. 
Along this line, other papers argue that implicit or explicit guarantees provided by 
central banks create moral hazard: banks and firms take too much risk and hold 
unhedged positions (e.g., McKinnon and Pill, 1999, Burnside et al., 2001, Schneider 
and Tornell, 2004). A (credible) fixed exchange rate regime eliminates the need to 
hedge the exchange rate exposure; hence banks and firms end up with excessive foreign 
currency debt on their balance sheets. These effects can be further reinforced by 
incomplete markets, lack of hedging instruments, so that agents cannot hedge their 
exposure even if they would choose to hedge were they to have derivatives (Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy, 2003). These studies, however, take as given monetary and 
exchange rate policies.  
Only a few recent theoretical papers combine the two strands in literature by 
exploring the interrelationships between balance sheets and monetary and exchange 
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rate policy. Chang and Velasco (2005) construct a model where the optimal choice of 
the exchange rate policy by a benevolent central bank depends on the existence and 
extent of currency mismatches, which are in turn determined by the optimizing 
decisions of domestic borrowers and their expectations about the exchange rate 
policy. They find that currency mismatches in assets and liabilities may not only give 
rise to fear of floating, but that they themselves may emerge because of the rational 
anticipation of that fear. 
Along a similar line, Chamon and Hausmann (2005) focus on the decision by the 
central bank, which cares about preventing bankruptcy, of whether to let the exchange 
rate depreciate following a shock to the expected future exchange rate, and on optimal 
portfolio allocations driven by these changes in expectations. When the central bank 
has a strong preference for exchange rate stability (e.g., because of large currency 
mismatches), domestic agents will denominate their liabilities in dollars. 
Ize (2005) examines balance sheets under endogenous policy choices and different 
institutional and market environments: risk aversion, imperfect information, and 
moral hazard. In Cowan and Do (2003), imperfect information (bad priors about the 
central bank) induces excessive dollarization, which in turn restricts the ability of 
central bank to conduct monetary policy. The conclusion of these four studies is the 
same: balance sheets effects and fear of floating co-exist and reinforce each other. 
Despite extensive theoretical work on balance sheets and policy choices, the 
empirical work is scant. Empirical findings so far are best summarized by Ize and 
Levy-Yeyati (2005): “While there is a clear statistical cross-country link between 
dollarization and fear of floating (…), the direction of causality has not been tested 
and the specific dynamics through which these two variables interact not fully 
identified”. Hausmann et al. (2001) document a very strong and robust relationship 
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between the ability of a country to borrow internationally in its own currency and the 
way it manages its exchange rate system. The higher the ability to borrow abroad in 
its own currency and thus the lower the international liability dollarization (also called 
original sin), the higher the flexibility of the exchange rate regime. Reinhart et al. 
(2003) provide evidence that aggregate dollarization, measured by domestic plus 
external dollar liabilities of the private and public sectors is negatively correlated with 
the flexibility of the exchange rate regime. Honig (2005) finds negative effects from 
both domestic and external bank dollar liabilities to exchange rate flexibility, while 
Ganapolsky (2003) shows that banks’ dollar debts which are not matched by dollar 
liabilities reduce the flexibility. While most papers acknowledge the possibility that 
balance sheet allocations are endogenous to policy choices, they ignore this problem. 
Two studies that address the endogeneity of balance sheets are Levy-Yeyati et al. 
(2004) and Alesina and Wagner (2006). The first paper shows that bank liability 
dollarization is a good predictor of the “de facto” exchange rate regime, while 
instrumenting dollar liabilities by their own lagged values and a rule of law indicator. 
Alesina and Wagner (2006) also show that more foreign liabilities lead countries to prefer 
fixed over floating regimes, but their focus is on countries’ incentive to misreport their 
exchange rate regimes. They examine the reverse effect from policy to portfolio choices 
(by instrumenting foreign liabilities by institution development measures) and find none. 
Fewer empirical studies examine portfolio allocations for domestic agents given 
the exchange rate regime. Hausmann and Panizza (2003) find limited evidence that 
flexible exchange rate regimes reduce domestic dollar liabilities and no evidence of 
effects on external dollarization. According to Arteta (2003), bank domestic currency 
mismatches increase with exchange rate flexibility, as dollar deposits go up relative to 
dollar loans. However, Goldstein and Turner (2004) argue that exchange rate 
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flexibility reduces currency mismatches. Their argument is based on stylized facts for 
several countries and earlier work on firms’ currency risk exposure under different 
exchange rate regimes (e.g., Martinez and Werner, 2002, and Cowan, 2003). Whether 
exchange rate flexibility affects portfolio choices remains an open question. 
To summarize, only a few theoretical and no empirical studies explore the 
interrelationships between balance sheets and the degree of flexibility of the exchange 
rate regime. To our knowledge, our study is the first to examine carefully the 
dynamics through which these two variables interact and the direction of causality. 
We ask whether fear of floating generates currency mismatches on domestic agents’ 
balance sheet, or whether currency mismatches lead to fear of floating, or whether 
effects go both ways. We use annual unbalanced panel data for up to 101 emerging 
and developing countries for the period 1975-2004 and standard measures of fear of 
floating (exchange rate flexibility), balance sheet mismatches, and liability 
dollarization. 
Our methodology consists of two parts. We first show that the degree of flexibility 
of the exchange rate regime depends negatively on lagged bank currency mismatches, 
controlling for macroeconomic policies and institutions. We then show that currency 
mismatches and dollar liabilities depend negatively on lagged exchange rate 
flexibility, using the same controls. We use both simple pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares and system-Generalized-Method-of-Moments estimators. Having empirically 
established Granger causality, we next study the dynamic relationship between 
balance sheets and exchange rate regimes by estimating orthogonalized impulse-
response functions using panel vector autoregression. Overall, we find statistical 
evidence that this lack of exchange rate flexibility reinforces mismatches and raises 
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the value of dollar liabilities, but not the reverse effect. We also find that the 
estimated economic effects are small. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and the 
measures of balance sheets and exchange rate management used. Section 3 outlines the 
econometric models and the estimation methods.  Section 4 presents the results, while 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Data  
We use annual data for the period 1975-2004 for up to 101 emerging and 
developing countries, covering all types of exchange rate regimes (see Appendix A).14 
Most of our data come from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF and the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank (see Appendix B for all data 
sources). The exchange rate is the bilateral rate to the German mark for the European 
countries, the French franc for several African countries, and the US dollar for all 
other countries (see Appendices A and B). We eliminate all offshore centers, 
countries with fewer than four years in the dataset, and remove outliers for several 
variables.  
The time period for the Granger causality tests include periods of currency crises, 
such as the 1994-1995 crisis in Latin America, the 1997-1998 crisis in the East Asian, 
the 1998 crisis in Russia, and the 2001-2002 crisis in Argentina. Currency crises can 
affect the causal relationship between balance sheets and the exchange rate flexibility. 
During crisis periods the depreciation of the domestic currency can be very large. 
Under this condition, higher exchange rate flexibility results in larger currency 
                                                 
14 The earlier papers exploring fear of floating (e.g., Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, and Hausman et al., 
2001) include only countries that claim to be floaters but instead intervene heavily in the foreign 
exchange market.  Our study is more general because it includes all countries for which data for our 
main indicators are available, irrespective of their “de jure” exchange rate regime. 
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mismatches and liability dollarization because the dollar liabilities are now larger in 
terms of domestic currency. Currency mismatches lead to more fixed exchange rate 
regimes only when the fixed exchange rate regime is sustainable. Currency value 
declines dramatically, if there is very high inflation during crisis episodes. The fixed 
exchange rate regime will collapse if the central bank fails to defend it. Large 
currency mismatches may increase the exchange rate flexibility if exchange rates are 
forced to float because of hyperinflation during currency crisis.  Then currency 
mismatches might be positively associated with exchange rate flexibility during crisis 
periods. To eliminate the effects of currency crises on the relationship between 
balance sheets and exchange rate flexibility, we drop all the years in which there is a 
currency crisis. We use the measure of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) to distinguish 
crisis periods and non-crisis periods. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) introduce a new 
category of exchange rate regime, freely falling. An exchange rate regime is 
categorized as freely falling if the twelve-month inflation rate is 40% or higher. A 
year is viewed as crisis period if the exchange rate regime is classified as freely 
falling15.  
2.2.1 Exchange rate flexibility and balance sheet measures 
As indicators of exchange rate regime flexibility, we use two standard measures in 
the literature. We first use an index of exchange rate flexibility, 1FLEX , following the 
pioneering work of Calvo and Reinhart (2002), calculated as the ratio of the volatility 
of nominal exchange rate changes to the sum of volatility of the nominal interest rate 
and volatility of international reserve changes. A high value of this measure indicates 
large variance in the exchange rate relative to that in reserves and the interest rate, 
therefore a more flexible exchange rate regime. A value close to zero indicates little 
                                                 




exchange rate volatility and/or heavy intervention in the foreign exchange market 
either through reserves or through the interest rate, and hence more fear of floating 
and exchange rate rigidity. 
Following a more recent study by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), we use 
another measure, 2FLEX , defined as the ratio of volatility of exchange rate changes 
to volatility of net international reserve relative to monetary base changes. This latter 
measure improves upon 1FLEX  by approximating as closely as possible changes in 
reserves that reflect foreign exchange intervention, and eliminating the interest rates, 
where changes have limited effect on exchange market conditions and much more 
often are unrelated to the management of the exchange rate (Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2005). 
Chang and Velasco (2005) argue that large currency mismatches rather than large 
dollar liabilities create fear of floating. However, as Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004) point 
out, holders of foreign assets and liabilities might not coincide, and a sudden 
depreciation is likely to hurt dollar debtors irrespective of the aggregate level of dollar 
assets. Hence, according to the latter study, empirical studies using aggregate data 
should consider (gross) dollar liabilities rather than (net) currency mismatches. We 
construct measures of both mismatches and liability dollarization. Moreover, we 
believe central banks are mostly concerned with the dollar liabilities and mismatches 
of banks, we only consider flows intermediated through local banks. 
We construct four measures of liability dollarization and currency mismatches. 
, defined as the ratio of bank foreign liabilities to money stock (similar to Levy-




component of bank liability dollarization. 16 But many emerging markets have high 
levels of domestic dollar liabilities (see Arteta, 2003, and Honig, 2005), therefore our 
second measure, , is defined as the ratio of bank foreign liabilities plus domestic 
dollar deposits to money stock (similar to Calvo et al., 2004).
2LIAB
17  and  
are rough measures of currency mismatches. The first is defined as the ratio of bank 
foreign liabilities to bank foreign assets; the latter is the ratio of bank foreign 
liabilities plus domestic dollar deposits to bank foreign assets.
1MISM 2MISM
18
A simple correlation analysis shows that our measures of dollar liabilities and 
currency mismatches are positively correlated, and so are the two flexibility measures 
(see Table 2.1). Moreover, we confirm the negative relationship between balance sheets, 
in particular currency mismatches and external liabilities and the exchange rate 
flexibility19, which is also shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. 
2.2.2 Data on other variables 
Other potential determinants of exchange rate regimes, based on extensive prior 
work are inflation, fiscal deficit as a percent of GDP, real GDP growth, and trade 
openness (e.g., Canales-Kriljenko and Habermeier, 1999). Balance sheets, on the 
                                                 
16 The “original sin” literature shows that very few emerging and developing countries manage to 
borrow in domestic currencies in international financial markets.  Hence, foreign currency-
denominated external liabilities can be approximated by total external liabilities. 
17 Calvo et al. (2004) calculate bank dollar liabilities relative to domestic GDP.  For consistency purposes, we 
use the money stock instead of the GDP, but the two measures are highly correlated and the results are very 
similar. 
18 Our strategy is to use measures for which data are available for a large number of countries as 
opposed to more carefully constructed measures of mismatches but with limited data availability (e.g., 
Hausmann et al., 2001, and Goldstein and Turner, 2004).  Therefore, our currency mismatch measures 
do not include some dollar bank assets, such as dollar-denominated government securities, which are 
quite significant in several Latin American countries (Reinhart et al., 2003).  Neither do they include 
the off-balance sheet positions of banks.  We on purpose choose not to include domestic dollar credit in 
our measure of bank dollar assets, as a large share of this credit goes to firms from nontradable 
industries, directly increasing firms’ and indirectly banks’ exposure to the currency risk (Goldstein and 
Turner, 2004). 
19 Total mismatches are positively correlated with total liabilities. This may be caused by crisis, when 
high inflation leads to depreciation of the domestic currency, which raises the value of foreign 
liabilities.    
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other hand, are affected by domestic macroeconomic policies and institutions 
(Goldstein and Turner, 2004). 
We include Inflation, which is the inflation rate calculated using the consumer 
price index.  FiscalBudget controls for fiscal policy, and represents the government 
budget relative to GDP, with a positive (negative) number indicating a budget surplus 
(deficit). RealGDPGr represents the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. In 
addition, to capture real shocks we also include the growth rate of terms of trade, 
TotGr, defined as the export price index to the import price index (Levy-Yeyati et al., 
2004).  TradeOpen measures the real openness of the economy, that is, export plus 
imports as a share of GDP. Two additional variables that are likely to be relevant for 
emerging and developing economies are CALiberaliz20, the first principle component 
of four IMF binary variables, the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on 
current account, capital account transactions, and the requirement of the surrender of 
export proceeds (Chinn and Ito 2006), and FinanDevelop, an index which measures 
domestic financial development by combining the ratio of bank liquid liabilities to 
GDP with the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP, following Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (1996) (see Appendix B). 
In general, we find that exchange rate flexibility is positively correlated with the 
rate of inflation and financial development, and negatively correlated with trade 
openness and capital account liberalization. Currency mismatches and dollar liabilities 
are significantly higher in countries with open capital account and a higher inflation 
rate. Trade openness is positively correlated with liabilities, but negatively correlated 
with mismatches. Financial development and the other controls are not significantly 
correlated with our main variables. 
                                                 




2.3 Methodology  
2.3.1 Granger causality tests 
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where , }2,1{ FLEXFLEXFLEX ∈ }2,1{ MISMMISMMISM ∈ , is the set of control 
variables,  is the time-fixed effect, 
itd
tp itε and itν are error terms, the subscripts i and t 
represent country and time period, respectively, while j is the number of lags. 




We estimate Eqs.(1) and (2) first by pooled OLS (with errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and cluster serial correlation), which assumes that past errors are 
uncorrelated with regressors.  That is, MISM  and  are exogenous variables in 
Eq.(1) and there is no feedback effect from the exchange rate policy to balance sheets. 
At the same time, the exchange rate regime is exogenous in Eq.(2), as balance sheets 
do not affect future choices of exchange rate policy. 
LIAB
If, however, the explanatory variables are endogenous, the estimated coefficients 
will be biased. Therefore, we also estimate the model using the system-Generalized-
Method-of-Moments (system-GMM) estimator for dynamic panel data implemented 
by Roodman (2005) based on Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). This estimator only requires weak exogeneity: the explanatory variables can 
now be correlated with past and present errors. The estimator uses as instruments in 
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the first-difference equations lagged levels of the dependant and endogenous variables, 
and lagged differences in the level equations. 
The dynamic panel approach offers advantages to OLS and improves on previous 
efforts to examine the link between balance sheets and exchange rate flexibility. First, 
we eliminate any unobserved country fixed effects, which were included in the error 
terms before and were a source of bias in the OLS estimated coefficients. Second, we 
control for potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Moreover, by using the 
system-GMM, which combines the regression in differences with the regression in 
levels, instead of the difference-GMM estimator, we reduce the bias associated with 
weak instruments due to the high persistence in some of the explanatory variables (see 
Blundell and Bond, 1998, for a further discussion of the estimator). The system-GMM 
is also more efficient than the difference-GMM. 
We check consistency of the system-GMM estimator with two specification tests 
suggested by Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998): a Hansen test of 
over-identifying restrictions, which checks the overall validity of instruments, and the 
Arrelano-Bond test of serial correlation in the error term, verifying that the differenced 
error term is not second-order serially correlated (while, by construction, the differenced 
error term should be first-order serially correlated). 
2.3.2 Orthogonalized impulse-response functions 
To further study the dynamic relationships between balance sheets and exchange 
rate flexibility, we estimate a panel vector autoregression (panel VAR) model 
ittijitjitit erczzz +++Γ+Γ+Γ= −− 11110 ...  (3) 
 where is a vector ,  is the set of control variables 
assumed now all endogenous,  is the unobserved country-fixed effect,  is the time 




fixed-effect, and   is the error term. Alternatively, we replace MISM by  and 
re-estimate the model. 
ite LIAB
We estimate a reduced-form VAR with restrictions imposed on the structural 
model parameters in order to achieve identification. The identification assumption is 
that variables that come earlier in the ordering affect the following variables 
contemporaneously, as well as with lags, while the variables that come later only 
affect the previous variables with lags. In our first specification we assume that 
balance sheets do not contemporaneously affect exchange rates. Second, we assume 
that exchange rates do not contemporaneously affect balance sheets. Note that with 
this methodology we rule out two-way contemporaneous causality between currency 
mismatches and dollar liabilities and exchange rate regimes. 
To estimate the model above, we proceed as follows. First, the unobserved time 
effects are removed by time-demeaning the data. Second, the unobserved country 
fixed effects are removed by forward mean-differencing. This latter procedure, also 
called the Helmert procedure, avoids the bias in the system-GMM coefficients 
introduced by first-differencing (Arrelano and Bover, 1995). The model is then 
estimated by system-GMM. We further estimate and present the orthogonalized 
impulse-response functions, which describe the reaction of one variable in the system 
to innovations in another variable in the system, assuming that all other shocks are 
zero. The impulse-response functions are estimated under the two different 
specifications (orderings).  Standard errors of the impulse-response functions are 
computed using Monte-Carlo simulations. We then perform a variance decomposition 





2.4 Results  
2.4.1 Granger causality tests 
The estimation results for multivariate Granger causality tests conducted using 
pooled OLS and system-GMM are reported in Tables 2.2a through 2.3b. We initially 
set the number of lags j equal to 4 since we have at least 4 observations for each 
variable and test for joint significance of lagged independent variables. We 
successively lower j, re-estimate the model, and stop when we find significant effects 
or when j equals 1 and the effects are insignificant.  Tables 2.2a and 2.2b reports the 
effects of balance sheets, and , and  and  respectively, on 
the exchange rate regime. Tables 2.3a and 2.3b report the reverse effects from 
exchange rate flexibility to balance sheets. We rely more on the measure  
which has more observations. Overall, we find evidence for Granger causality running 
from balance sheets to exchange rate flexibility, but not the other direction.  
1MISM 2MISM 1LIAB 2LIAB
1MISM
First, we do not find the negative impact of balance sheets on exchange rate 
flexibility This is different from the previous finding that balance sheets have a 
negative relationship with exchange rate flexibility (Table 2.3). Only external 
mismatches and external dollar liabilities have a negative and significant effect 
on 1FLEX ; and there is no other significant effect (see Table 2.4a and 2.4b). Note that 
the effects of balance sheet on exchange rate flexibility are insignificant with the 
system-GMM estimator in all cases.  This is not a surprising finding given their 
extremely high persistence (see the coefficients of and  in Table 2.5a 
and 2.5b), which questions the validity of the instruments. It suggests that a static 





Second, we find a negative effect from policy choices to external mismatches and 
dollar liabilities (see Table 2.5a and 2.5b), which previous studies either ignored (e.g., 
Ganapolsky, 2005, and Honig, 2005) or failed to find (Alesina and Wagner, 2006). 
We find that both 1FLEX  and  have a negative effect on external mismatches, 
but not on total mismatches. The effects are significant with both OLS and GMM 
estimators. The negative impact of flexibilities on balance sheets is more obvious for 
liabilities. Both
2FLEX
1FLEX and  have a negative effect on both external and total 
dollar liabilities. The effects are significant with OLS estimators in all cases. 
2FLEX
While the statistical effects are negative and significant, the economic effects in 
both directions are rather small. We find that a 1 standard deviation increase in 
 is associated with only a 0.02 standard deviation reduction in exchange rate 
flexibility and a 1 standard deviation increase in  is associated with a 0.1 
standard deviation reduction in flexibility. The reverse effect is small as well: a 1 
standard deviation increase in flexibility is associated with a 0.02-0.06 standard 
deviation reduction in mismatches and a 0.03-0.05 standard deviation reduction in 
dollar liabilities. Our findings suggest, contrary to Hausmann et al. (2001), that 




We also find that capital account liberalization and domestic financial 
development have significant effects on exchange rate flexibility. Higher capital 
account openness reduces the exchange rate flexibility while more developed 
financial markets increase it. Developing countries with large capital flows tend to 
adopt more fixed exchange rate regime to protect domestic agents. Countries with 
more developed financial markets do not do this since domestic hedges are available. 
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Trade openness has a negative effect on exchange rate flexibility both 
1FLEX and , but it is not significant statistically in most cases.  2FLEX
2.4.2 Orthogonalized impulse-response functions 
Next, we estimate a reduced form panel VAR model using Love (2001). The set 
of control variables, assumed now all endogenous, includes the statistically significant 
variables from the earlier specifications: FinanDevelop, CALiberaliz, TradeOpen, and 
Inflation. 
We estimate a panel VAR and report the orthogonalized impulse-response functions, 
which describe the reaction of one variable in the system to innovations in another 
variable in the system, assuming that all other shocks are zero. This allows us to better 
study the dynamic effects between balance sheets and exchange rates. As discussed 
before, this methodology requires special assumptions about contemporaneous effects 
in order to achieve identification. We estimate the panel VAR for the number of lags 
equal to 1 through 4, and report the result of the number of lags that generates the least 
correlated residuals. 
Figures 2.3-2.10 report impulse response functions. Figures 2.3, 2.5, 2.7, and 2.9 
assume no contemporaneous effects from balance sheets to flexibility, while Figures 
2.4, 2.6, 2.8, and 2.10 assume no contemporaneous effects from flexibility to balance 
sheets.  
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 presents the impulse-response functions for the panel VAR 
estimated using external mismatches  and the exchange rate flexibility 
measures, 
1MISM
1FLEX  and alternatively 2FLEX . We choose 1 lag for  and 1MISM 1FLEX , 
and 4 lags for  and 1MISM 2FLEX . We find that exchange rates become less flexible 
in response to an increase in mismatches and this effect is not statistically significant 
with 1FLEX . But it is significant with 2FLEX  in short and mid-term. Mismatches 
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decrease with exchange rate flexibility and this effect is statistically significant with 
1FLEX  in the short run.  
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 reports the impulse-response functions for exchange rate 
flexibility and total mismatches . We choose 3 lags for  and 2MISM 2MISM 1FLEX , 
and 2 lags for  and 2MISM 2FLEX . We do not find any effect between exchange rate 
flexibility and total mismatches. The model might be misspecified as the residuals in 
the equations for exchange rate flexibility and mismatches are highly correlated, for 
both 1FLEX  and 2FLEX . This might also be caused by the lack of variability of some 
controls, especially financial development and trade openness. We re-estimate the 
panel VAR without the two controls. The residuals are not correlated, and currency 
mismatches are negatively correlated with exchange rate flexibility. But the effects 
are not statistically significant. 
The impulse-response functions for exchange rates flexibility and both external 
and total liabilities are presented in Figures 2.7-2.10. We choose 4 lags for  and 1LIAB
1FLEX , 1 lag for and 1LIAB 2FLEX , and 4 lags for . We find that both external 
and total liabilities decline when exchange rates become more flexible, for both 
2LIAB
1FLEX  and 2FLEX . But the effects are not statistically significant. There is no 
contemporaneous effect from external liabilities to exchange rate flexibility. In the 
short-run total liabilities have a negative effect on exchange rate flexibility. In the 
long run the effects of both external and total liabilities on exchange rate flexibility 
are positive. None of the effect is statistically significant. This might be also caused 
by the lack of variability of trade openness and financial development. When the two 
controls are dropped, the effects of external liabilities on exchange rate flexibility 
become negative. The two-way effect between  and 1LIAB 1FLEX  is significant with 1 
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lag. But the effects between total liabilities and exchange rate flexibility do not 
change.   
The economic effects are small, as documented by variance decompositions 
performed over 10 years and reported in Table 2.6 separately for each 
pair .),( MISMFLEX 21 In most cases, the variation in both exchange rate flexibilities 
and mismatches is mainly explained by their own innovations. For external mismatches, 
and both external and total dollar liabilities, less than 6 percent of balance sheet 
variation is explained by innovations in exchange rate flexibilities, with a maximum of 
5.71 percent variation in  explained by innovations to2LIAB 1FLEX . Less than 2 
percent of the exchange rate variation is explained by balance sheet innovations, with a 
maximum of 1.69 percent variation in 1FLEX  explained by innovations to . 
This is not true for total mismatches .  
1MISM
2MISM
In the cases of total mismatches, the variance of balance sheets or exchange rate 
flexibility is not mainly explained by their own innovations. The variation of these 
variables is mostly explained by capital account liberalization and financial 
development. This may be related to the lack of volatility of financial development and 
trade openness. We drop these two variables and re-estimate panel VAR. We find that 
the variation of both balance sheets and exchange rate flexibilities is mostly explained 
by themselves. Since the result of impulse response does not change much, we keep the 
two controls.  
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Over the past couple of years there has been extensive theoretical and empirical 
literature that explores either the effects of balance sheets on exchange rate regimes or 
                                                 
21  The reported effects are for the panel VAR estimated assuming that mismatches do not 
contemporaneously affect exchange rates.  The effects are very similar when the ordering is reversed. 
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the role of exchange rate flexibility on balance sheets and portfolio choices. However, 
there are only several recent theoretical papers and no empirical studies that explore 
the interrelationships between balance sheets and exchange regimes. 
This paper empirically studies the interrelationships between balance sheets, more 
precisely banks’ domestic and external dollar liabilities and currency mismatches, and 
the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate regime. We ask whether dollarized 
portfolios lead to fear of floating, or whether fear of floating generates currency 
mismatches on domestic agents’ balance sheet, or whether effects go both ways. We 
use annual panel data for up to 101 emerging and developing countries for the period 
1975-2004 and standard measures of exchange rate flexibility and balance sheets. We 
examine the interrelationship only for tranquil period by eliminating periods of 
currency crisis. 
We do not find the negative effect of balance sheets on exchange rate flexibility 
except for external mismatches. We find evidence that the fear of floating or lack of 
flexibility of the exchange rate regime affects agents’ portfolios and amplifies 
mismatches which is found both for external mismatches and dollar liabilities, both 
external and total liabilities. However, while this effect is statistically significant, their 
economic relevance is rather low.  
In this paper, annual data are used. When high frequency data are available, the 
measures of balance sheets can be recalculated. For future study, new control 








Emerging market economies are those that experienced economic and policy 
reform, and are moving from closed to open market. These economies are in the 
transitional stage between developing and developed economy. According to the 
World Bank, the largest five emerging market economies are China, India, Indonesia, 
Brazil and Russia. Usually these economies enjoy high growth rate, depend heavily 
on exports and have large amount of capital inflows. The choice of exchange rate 
regime is important for them to maintain high volume of exports and steady economic 
growth. The more open they are, the more they are affected by exchange rate 
fluctuations. Therefore, a stable exchange rate is essential for these economies to 
maintain a stable trade and income growth.  
Some emerging market economies adopt a free floating exchange rate regime, 
where exchange rates are free from the intervention of the central bank. Many other 
emerging market economies adopt a fixed exchange rate regime, where exchange 
rates are under the control of the central bank. There are a lot of concerns about these 
corner solutions. 
An independent floating exchange rate regime increases the fluctuations of 
exchange rates, which harms international trade (Rose, 2000). Almost all emerging 
market economies depend on exports to improve economic growth. A flexible 
exchange rate regime leads to more volatile exchange rates, which will change 
relative prices and cause fluctuations in trade balance and income. An appreciation of 
the domestic currency reduces exports and income. Nowadays outsourcing is quite 
common among multinational national companies (MNC). Since most emerging 
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market economies have the advantage of low production costs, many MNCs move 
their factories to these economies. Production is carried out in several countries. Then 
emerging market economies have large imports of intermediate products. A 
depreciation of domestic currency raises the price of imports, then increases prices of 
outputs, and leads to inflation. This instability in trade and output associated with 
fluctuations of exchange rates makes it difficult to keep steady economic growth. 
Usually emerging market economies are unable to borrow abroad using domestic 
currencies, and they lack instruments to hedge foreign exchange risk. A depreciation 
of the domestic currency leads to an increase in foreign currency debt in terms of the 
domestic currency and a decline in wealth. Therefore, a freely floating exchange rate 
regime is not a good choice for emerging market economies.  
Compared with the flexible exchange rate regime, the fixed exchange rate regime 
or a hard peg has its advantage. Since exchange rates are stable, there are fewer 
fluctuations in international trade. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, there is no 
foreign exchange risk. Then there is no need to hedge the risk, which reduces 
transaction costs of international trade. That is why many emerging market economies 
claim that they adopt a flexible exchange rate regime but actually use interest rate or 
foreign currency reserves to manage exchange rates. This is the so called “fear of 
floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Since there is no foreign exchange risk, 
domestic agents tend to borrow more from abroad and investors from foreign 
countries tend to invest more in emerging market economies. That is why emerging 
market economies with a fixed exchange rate have high capital inflows. According to 
the “impossible trinity”, economies with free capital flow will lose independent 
monetary policy if they adopt a fixed exchange rate regime. On the other hand, 
defending a fixed exchange rate regime is costly. Central banks need to hold a large 
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amount of foreign currency reserves. If they run out of reserves, exchange rates would 
be out of control and become even more unstable. Fixed exchange regimes tend to 
incur speculative attack. If the central bank chooses to defend the fixed exchange rates, 
the economy is at risk of a free-falling of exchange rate, dramatic rise in foreign debt 
and decline in output. Then the large capital inflows might reverse, which could lead 
to bankruptcy of domestic banks and firms. This is what happens during currency and 
banking crises. 
Emerging market economies vary in size, growth rate, the standards of living, and 
institutions. However, many of them experienced financial crises during the 1990s. 
Examples include Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 
1999. These economies suffered large capital outflows and a slow-down in economic 
growth. Before the crises, they all adopted de facto fixed exchange rate regime 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005).  Pegged exchange 
rate regime was blamed as a main reason of crises. So the IMF recommended 
currency basket peg as a better form of peg.  
Currency basket peg is an intermediate exchange rate regime. By pegging to a 
basket of currency, a country can increase the flexibility of its exchange rates and 
reduce the exposure to speculative attack caused by a fixed exchange rate regime. At 
the same time, it can also reduce fluctuations of exchange rates caused by a flexible 
exchange rate regime. A currency basket peg leads to more volatile exchange rates 
than a hard peg, which reduces capital inflows and reduces the possibility of increases 
in the value of foreign currency debt and large capital outflows caused by a 
depreciation of the domestic currency. It seems that a currency basket peg is a more 
feasible exchange rate regime for emerging market economies. 
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Now many economies adopt a basket of currencies as an anchor to manage their 
currencies. Table 3.1 shows countries classified by the IMF as managing exchange 
rates against a currency basket in 2004. In addition, the Bank of Russia announced in 
2005 that the exchange rates of the Russian ruble have been managed against a basket 
of currency containing the U.S. dollar and the euro; in July 2005, the People’s Bank 
of China declared that the Chinese yuan would be pegged to currency basket 
containing the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the euro, the Korean won and some other 
currencies; and the Singapore dollar is monitored by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore against a trade-weighted basket of currencies. However, Daniels, 
Toumanoff, and von der Ruhr (2001) argue that some of the East Asian economies 
had adopted currency basket before the crisis, and it was the large weight of the U.S. 
dollar in the basket that caused the problem. Therefore, it is important to find the 
optimal weights for currency baskets of these emerging market economies.  
 Many emerging market economies have liberalized their capital account, which 
has led to increased capital inflows into these economies. FDI, an important 
component of capital inflows, increases by 60-400% during the period 1994-2004 for 
the five largest emerging market economies22. Capital inflows, especially FDI, are 
essential to the development of emerging market economies given the undeveloped 
financial markets of these economies. Capital account liberalization can be successful 
only when there are strong domestic financial markets. Undeveloped financial market 
and the lack of tools to hedge exchange risk leads to fear of floating. Without capital 
controls, large amount of capital inflows tends to incur currency crises. Another 
reason for imposing capital controls is to reduce turbulence in financial markets 
caused by disturbances, such as asymmetric information, political instability, and poor 
                                                 
22 Indonesia is an exception of this group. It was affected by the Asian crisis and experienced FDI out 
flows from 1998 to 2003. 
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institutions (Von Hagen and Zhou, 2005). According to the Annual Reports on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAE) of the IMF, these 
economies still have some kind of capital controls.  
Capital controls can take different forms. AREAE divides capital controls into 11 
categories, which include controls on capital market securities, money market 
instruments, collective investment securities, derivatives and other instruments, 
commercial credits, financial credits, guarantees, securities, and financial backup 
facilities, direct investment, liquidation of direct investment, real estate transactions, 
and personal capital transactions. They can be imposed on capital inflows or on 
outflows. According to the IMF, capital controls can be imposed on short-term 
inflows to limit the size and volatility of inflows. Chile applied a tax on capital 
inflows during the period of 1991-1998 to prevent appreciation the Chilean peso. 
Brazil used a number of capital control measures on short-term inflows from 1993 to 
1997 to stabilize interest rate differentials and reduce appreciation pressure. Examples 
of this kind of capital controls also include Columbia (1993-1998), Malaysia (1994), 
and Thailand (1995-1997). Controls on outflows are used to reduce the depreciation 
pressure on domestic currencies during financial crises. After the Asian financial 
crisis, Malaysia imposed capital control on outflows in 1998 to get some monetary 
autonomy. Capital controls of Spain (1992) and Thailand (1997-1998) are also of this 
type (Ariyoshi et al, 2000).  
The main reason why many emerging market economies impose controls on 
capital inflow is keep the competitiveness of domestic firms (Herrera and Valdés, 
2000). Another reason for controls on inflows is that temporary capital inflows tend to 
incur reversals of inflows (Reinhart and Smith, 2001). A temporary tax on inflows can 
reduce this risk through increasing the cost of foreign currency debt and reducing the 
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amount of inflows (Reinhart and Smith, 1998). Von Hagen and Zhou (2005) find that 
capital controls are most likely to be adopted by economies with intermediate 
exchange rate regime. Therefore the existence of capital control should not be 
neglected in the choice of the optimal currency basket. 
This paper tries to find the optimal weights of a currency basket for emerging 
markets. The model is based on the work of Turnovsky (1982). He uses a general 
equilibrium macro model for a small open economy to derive the optimal weights for 
a currency basket by minimizing the variance of output. His model is extended by 
adding trade balance as another target of objective function. In addition, Turnovsky 
(1982) assumes perfect capital mobility, while this paper assumes imperfect capital 
mobility, allowing domestic country to impose a reserve requirement which is led in 
different currencies on capital inflows. The model of the domestic interest rate with 
capital control is based on Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000). Their model 
examines the effect of a single–currency reserve requirement, while the model in this 
paper investigates the effect of a two-currency reserve requirement. 
In this paper, a general equilibrium model for small open economy is used to 
derive the optimal weight for a two-currency basket. The optimal weight is derived by 
minimizing the loss from variance of output and trade balance. The results show that 
under the condition of imperfect capital mobility, the optimal weights are affected by 
variance of the cross exchange rate between the two major currencies, the covariance 
between inflations in the two large countries and the cross exchange rate, the relative 
weights assigned to trade and output, and price and exchange rate elasticities of trade, 
demand and supplies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing 
literature about the optimal choice a currency basket; Section 3 establishes the 
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theoretical model for a small open economy with a currency basket and derives the 
optimal weights; Section 4 discusses some properties of the optimal weights; and 
Section 5 summarize the findings of this paper. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
There are two types of models in existing literature on the optimal weights for a 
currency basket. One type of models uses welfare as a criterion for determining the 
optimal exchange rate regime. Welfare is maximized to get the optimal weight for 
each component of the currency basket. Devereux and Engel (1998) investigate the 
effects of price setting on the optimal choice of exchange rate regime. Teo (2004) 
constructs a three-country sticky price general equilibrium model and use the 
expected lifetime utility of households as the criterion to investigate the impact of the 
U.S. dollar as an invoicing currency on the optimal currency basket of East Asian 
economies. 
Another type of models constructs a loss function of some macroeconomic 
variables. The loss from these variables is minimized to get the optimum weights. To 
get the optimal weight, first a target has to be chosen. Different macroeconomic 
variables are used as targets, the most commonly used being the trade balance. Ogawa 
and Ito (2002) use a two-country game theory model to derive the optimal weights for 
a currency basket including the U.S. dollar and the yen by minimizing trade balance 
fluctuations. Another target usually considered is the output. Turnovsky (1982) uses a 
three country model to get the optimal weight for a currency basket of a small open 
economy by minimizing the volatility in income. A third choice is inflation. However, 
Masson, Savastano and Sharma (1997) claim that for most developing countries, 
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inflation targeting is not suitable because central banks lack the ability to conduct an 
independent monetary policy.  
Other authors choose multiple targets. Bhandari (1985) adopts a three-country 
stochastic equilibrium model and chooses a loss function which includs a trade-
weighted real effective exchange rate and output. Branson and Katsli (1981) and Han 
(2000) use a multi-country model and get the optimal currency basket by minimizing 
trade balance and aggregate price level together. Daniel, Toumanoff, and von der 
Ruhr (2001) extend the model of Turnovsky (1982) and get the optimal currency 
basket by minimizing the volatility of domestic consumer prices and that of foreign 
reserves. Bénassy-Quéré (1999) uses a loss function including trade and external debt. 
Bird and Rajan (2002) extend the model of Bénassy-Quéré (1999) and derive a loss 
function of imports, exports and foreign currency debt from the loss from output and 
inflation. 
These papers assume perfect capital mobility or neglect the effect of capital 
mobility. Turnovsky (1982), Bhandari (1985), Bird and Rajan (2002), and Daniel, 
Toumanoff, and von der Ruhr (2001) all assume perfect capital mobility so that 
uncovered interest rate parity holds. Bénassy-Quéré (1999), Ogawa and Ito (2002), 
and Teo (2004) do not take into account the effect of capital flows. However, if there 
are controls on capital mobility, the domestic interest rate should be higher than the 
world interest rate. Since capital controls are common in emerging market economies, 
they should be taken into account when choosing the optimal currency basket. 
For emerging market economies, the growth rate is important for improving 
development. Fluctuations in output are harmful to economic growth. Most of these 
countries improve economic growth by increasing exports. Fluctuations in trade 
balance can also slow down the economic growth. So both output and trade are 
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important. In this paper, the second type of model is used.  The optimal weights of a 
currency basket for emerging market economies are derived by minimizing the loss 
function of the volatility of both output and trade balance.  
 
3.3. The Model 
A three-country model is used in this paper. There is one small open economy 
and two large economies. The domestic country is the small economy. Country 1 and 
Country 2 are large economies. It is assumed that the domestic country does not have 
an impact on either Country 1 or Country 2. Macroeconomic aggregates and prices in 
Country 1 and Country 2 are viewed as exogenous. The domestic currency is pegged 
to a currency basket composed of the currencies of both large countries, Currency1 
and Currency 2, respectively. 
3.3.1 Setup of the model 
This model is based on Turnovsky (1982) and Bhandari (1985). The analysis 
focuses on the goods sector only. The specification of the aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply functions follows the model of Turnovsky (1982), while that for 
exports and imports follows the model of Bhandari (1985). 
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tY : domestic output at time t, 
itY : income of country i, i =1, 2,  
tP : domestic price level, 
itP : price level of country i, i =1,2, 
tR : gross domestic interest rate,  
itM : imports from country i, i = 1, 2, 
itX : exports to country i, i =1, 2, 
tNX : trade balance, 
itE : exchange rate between domestic currency and currency i at time t, measured 
in units of domestic currency per unit of currency i, i =1, 2, 
E : the currency bask in terms of the domestic currency, expressed as price of one 
unit of the basket  
tE3 : the cross exchange rate between currency 1 and 2 measured by units of 
currency 1 per unit of currency 2. 
tw : stochastic disturbance in domestic aggregate demand, 
tε : stochastic disturbance in domestic aggregate supply. 
Equation (1) describes the demand for domestic goods. The demand for domestic 
goods is the sum of consumption which is positively related to domestic income  tY
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(equation 2), investment which is negatively related to the domestic interest rate  
(equation 3), and trade balance .  is nominal domestic income. So the demand 
for domestic goods also depends negatively on the domestic price level . The 
demand for domestic goods is subject to a stochastic demand shock . Equation (4) 






tε .  and tw tε  are assumed to be iid and follow a normal distribution. 
),0(~ 2wt Nw σ  
),0(~ 2εσε Nt  
Equations (5a)-(5d) describe imports and exports between the domestic country 
and the two large countries. Imports  and exports  are modeled following 
Bhandari (1985). For simplicity, imports depend only on the real exchange rate. 
Exports depend on the real exchange rate and foreign income. Equation (6) is the 
trade balance. 
itM itX
A two-currency basket is shown in equation (7). It is pegged to currencies of both 
countries with a weight 1λ  for Currency 1 and 2λ  for Currency 2. The currency 
basket E , which is assumed to be constant, is the weighted average of exchange rates 
between domestic currency and the two foreign currencies  and . If one of the 
weights is 0, the currency basket becomes a single currency peg. The monetary 
authorities of the domestic country choose the weights to minimize the loss from 
fluctuations in output and trade balance. 
tE1 tE2
Equation (8) shows the cross exchange rate between Currency 1 and Currency 2.  
The cross exchange rate  is taken as given by the domestic small open economy.  tE3
From equations (1)-(3), demand for domestic goods can be expressed as  
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tttttt wPNXRYY +−+−= ϕδα                                      (9) 
Substituting equations (5a)-(5d) into equation (6) 
)(22)()( 213212211 tt
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The domestic price level , output  and net exports  can be derived from 
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From equation (7) and (8), the domestic exchange rates with the other two 
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3.3.2 The effects of capital controls  
In this section, models of Turnovsky (1982) and Bhandari (1985) are extended, 
which assume perfect capital mobility. This model extends their work to account for 
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capital controls. Therefore, the domestic country imposes a reserve requirement on 
capital inflows from Country 1 and Country 2 and the reserve must be held in 
currencies of both countries. When investors invest in the domestic country, they 
should deposit a fraction (u) of their investment in an account at the central bank. This 
account bears no interest. Investors get back the reserve requirement when they take 
their capital out of the domestic country. 1ρ of the reserve should be held in Currency 
1 and 2ρ  ( 12 1 ρρ −= ) in Currency 2. Since the reserve bears no interest, it works as a 
tax on capital inflows. With this reserve requirement, investors request an interest rate 
higher than the interest rate of the world market. Uncovered interest rate parity does 
not hold here. 
The domestic interest , at which foreign investors from Country 1 and Country 
2 are indifferent between investing in their home countries and the domestic country, 
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e
tE 11 +  and are expected exchange rates of the domestic currency against 
Currency1 and Currency 2 respectively at 
e
tE 12 +
1+t based on expectations at time t.   
is the expected cross exchange rate at 
e
tE 13 +
1+t . The exchange rates at equals 
exchange rates at t plus a stochastic disturbance . Then the exchange rates at 
1+t
tv 1+t  
are  
ttt vEE 1111 +=+                                                 (16a) 
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where ),(~ 211 1vt vv σ  and ),(~ 222 2vt vv σ . The expected exchange rates are 
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where . Then the expected cross exchange rate at ,  can be 
expressed as 
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Then, the domestic interest rate in terms of the interest rate of Country 1 and that of 
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The domestic interest rate  is affected by the reserve requirement, the choice of the 
weights of the currency basket, and the cross exchange rate between Currency 1 and 
Currency 2, as well as foreign interest rate. Because of the assumption that the 
expected value of the disturbance of the cross exchange rate is zero, the domestic 
interest is not affected by the share of each currency in the reserve,
tR
1ρ , and 2ρ . Since 
interest rate determines investment, the total output of the domestic country under 
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Substitute equation (15a), (15b) and (19a) into equation (12) and (13), we can get 
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3.3.3 Solution of the model 
The volatility of trade balance and output can be derived from equations (20) and 
(21). It is assumed that the cross exchange rate  is correlated with the foreign price 
level   and . For simplicity, all other variables are assumed to be independent of 
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2σ ’s represents the volatility of variables. The expressions of  and  




and 2λ . This is because domestic shocks have no impact on the cross exchange rate, 
since the domestic economy is small. Therefore, the covariance between the cross 
exchange rate and domestic shocks is zero. But the volatility of foreign interest rate 
affects the choice of the optimal weights as the domestic interest rate is affected by 
the cross exchange rate. 
 To find the optimal weight 1λ , a loss function is specified.  The loss function is 
minimized to get the optimal weights, as existing literature does (Turnovsky, 1982; 
Bénassy-Quéré, 1999; Daniel, Toumanoff, and von der Ruhr, 2001; and Ogawa and 
Ito, 2002; etc).  Here a loss function for the volatility of trade balance  and that of 
output  is adopted. The loss function is expressed as the weighted average of the 













1 NXYL σηση +=                                              (24) 
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where 121 =+ηη . The aim of the domestic policymakers is to find an optimal 
currency basket to minimize the loss from the volatilities of trade balance and output. 














































































































































































                                            (25) 
                       
      The optimal weight is affected by the relative importance of the volatility of 
output in the loss function 1η , the volatility of the cross exchange rate between the 
foreign currencies ,  the reserve requirement for capital inflows u , and the 





σ  and 
32EP
σ .  
Equation (25) is too complicated to be solved analytically. Numerical solver is 
used to derive the relationship between 1η , , , 23Eσ u 31EPσ  and 32EPσ . The results of 
simulation are shown in Table 3.2a and 3.2b.The values assigned to parameters are 
also shown in the tables.  
The results of simulation show that the optimal weight 1λ  changes with the 
covariance between the cross exchange rate and the price level of the two large 
economies, 
31EP
σ  and 
32EP
σ  when other variables are constant. 1λ  decreases with 31EPσ  
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and increases with the absolute value of 
32EP
σ . Because of the definition of , the 
price changes in Country 1,  is positively related to , while  is negatively 
related to  . When there is inflation in Country 1, Currency 1 will depreciate 
relative to Currency 2, and  will increase. When there is inflation in Country 2, 





tE3 31EPσ  is 
positive and 
32EP
σ  is negative. When 
31EP
σ  is higher, which means that the value of 
Currency 1 is more affected by inflation, Currency1 becomes relatively weaker than 
Currency 2. A lower weight should be assigned to Currency1. When the absolute 
value of 
32EP
σ  is higher, which means that Currency 2 is more affected by inflation. 
Currency 1 is relatively stronger than Currency 2. A higher weight should be assigned 
to Currency 1. More weight should be assigned to the currency that is less affected by 
inflation. 
Table 3.2a shows the relationship between 1λ  and 1η  an , when 23Eσ )( 3231 EPEP σσ +  
is positive. Table 3.2b shows the relationship between 1λ  and 1η  an , when 23Eσ
)(
3231 EPEP
σσ +  is negative. The results suggest that the relationship between the 
optimal weight and these variables differ when the sign of )(
3231 EPEP
σσ +  changes. 
When )(
3231 EPEP







σσ +  is negative, 1λ  increases with 1η , and decreases with  . The 




1λ  is not affected by the sign of 
)(
3231 EPEP
σσ + . 1λ  always decreases when u  increases. When the tax on capital 
inflows becomes higher, less weight should be assigned to Currency 1. As u  
increases, the domestic interest rate tends to increase. The domestic currency is 
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subject to an appreciation pressure. Currency 1 is more valuable than Currency 2. 
Reducing the weight of Currency 1 will increase the flexibility of the domestic 
currency and reduce the pressure of the central bank to defend the exchange rates. 
Since 
31EP
σ >0 and 
32EP
σ <0,  )(
3231 EPEP
σσ +  can be both positive and negative. 
The effects of the relative importance of the volatility of output 1η  and the volatility of 













σσ +  is positive, which means that 







σσ +  is negative, which means that the cross exchange rate is less affected 
by the inflation in Country 1. The result shows that more weight should be assigned to 
the currency of the country whose inflation has more effects on the fluctuations of the 
cross exchange rate when the cross exchange rate becomes more volatile, and less 
weight should be assigned to that currency if the stability of output is more important. 
When the cross exchange rates become more volatile, pegging to the less stable 
currency can increase the flexibility of the domestic currency, avoid speculative attack, 




In this paper, a three-country model is used to find the optimal weights in a 
currency basket for emerging market economies. For emerging economies, volatilities 
of trade balance and output can affect growth adversely. To determine the optimal 
weights, a loss function including the volatility of trade balance and output is 
minimized. The assumption of perfect capital mobility in Turnovsky (1982) is relaxed. 
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Capital inflows are subject to a tax in the form of a reserve requirement, which is held 
in the same currencies that enter in the currency basket. Uncovered interest rate parity 
does not hold because of this tax. The domestic interest rate is affected by the reserve 
requirement, and then trade balance, output, and the optimal weight of the currency 
basket are affected.   
The optimal choice of weights is affected by relative importance of the volatility 
of output in the loss function, the volatility of the cross exchange rate between the 
foreign currencies,  the reserve requirement for capital inflows, and the relationship 
between foreign price level and the cross exchange rate. The relative relationship 
between foreign price level and the cross exchange rate can influence the effects of 
the volatility of the cross exchange rate and the reserve requirement on the choice of 
the optimal weight. Other things constant, more weight should be assigned to the 
currency that is less affected by inflation. More weight should be assigned to the 
currency of the country whose inflation has more effects on the fluctuations of the 
cross exchange rate when the cross exchange rate becomes more volatile, and less 
weight should be assigned to that currency if the stability of output is more important. 
For future study, the model can be extended by letting the reserve requirement 
vary over time, so that it becomes a variable instead of a constant. In this paper, the 
domestic price is not affected by exogenous variables. The model can be revised by 
making the domestic price affected by foreign prices. The assumption that the cross 
exchange rate is not correlated with foreign interest rate can be relaxed so that the 
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
 
Table 1.1 Openness of Northeast Asia  
 
 1980 1990 1995 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 
China 15.48 35.52 45.68 41.38 39.21 49.06 48.54 54.77 66.13
Japan 28.16 18.32 16.80 20.42 19.56 20.18 20.16 21.13 22.01
Korea 70.92 55.82 58.75 65.39 79.46 78.49 73.31 69.12 73.81
Taiwan - 59.12 65.06 61.44 52.67 66.366 54.26 55.93 62.02
Note: Data of China, Japan, and Korea are from the Development Indicator of World Bank. 





Table 1.2 Shares of trade (%) 
 





China 1991 - 14.96 2.47 0.44 17.87 10.44 10.42 61.27
 1997 - 18.71 7.39 1.40 27.50 15.08 10.68 46.74
 2003 - 15.69 7.43 3.80 26.92 14.87 12.25 45.96
Japan 1991 4.14 - 5.89 5.09 15.12 26.44 13.99 44.45
 1997 8.36 - 5.36 5.36 19.09 25.58 10.95 44.38
 2003 15.52 - 6.16 5.20 26.88 20.69 11.16 41.27
Korea 1991 2.35 23.31 - 2.12 25.74 27.78 11.10 21.17
 1997 8.16 14.76 - 2.56 25.48 17.96 9.18 47.38
 2003 15.35 14.42 - 3.57 33.34 15.96 9.58 41.12
Taiwan 1991 0.43 20.17 2.18 - 22.78 26.21 12.39 38.62
 1997 1.92 17.21 3.13 - 22.26 22.32 11.91 43.51
 2003 11.93 16.41 4.89 - 33.23 15.76 9.51 41.50
Note: Shares of trade are calculated using data form Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shares of trade of Taiwan are calculated using data 




Table 1.3 The weight of each currency in the real effective exchange rate 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
U.S. Dollar 0.34 0.70 0.43 0.42 
Euro 0.26 0.30 0.21 0.22 
Japanese yen 0.40 - 0.36 0.36 







Table 1.4 Summary statistics (log difference) 
 
 Real GDP Growth 
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate Changes 
 Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
China 0.0904 0.0263 0.0669 0.1403 
Japan 0.0300 0.0228 -0.0064 0.1191 
Korea 0.0678 0.0357 0.0204 0.1588 
Taiwan 0.0709 0.0348 0.0156 0.1055 
 Real Money Balance Growth Inflation 
 Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
China 0.1625 0.0663 0.0486 0.0499 
Japan 0.0416 0.0481 0.0331 0.0452 
Korea 0.1080 0.0723 0.0808 0.0652 




Table 1.5a Correlation of real GDP growth 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan -0.08 (0.96) -  
Korea 0.20 (0.33) 0.37 (0.03) - 
Taiwan 0.33 (0.09) 0.62 (0.00) 0.42 (0.01) - 




Table 1.5b Correlation of real effective exchange rate growth 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan -0.17 (0.41) -  
Korea 0.21 (0.30) -0.08 (0.66) - 
Taiwan 0.54 (0.00) -0.23 (0.19) 0.14 (0.43) - 
















Table 1.5c Correlation of real money balance growth 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan -0.18 (0.37) -  
Korea -0.21 (0.30) 0.33 (0.06) - 
Taiwan -0.18 (0.38) 0.67 (0.00) 0.48 (0.00) - 




Table 1.5d Correlation of inflation 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan -0.03 (0.90) -  
Korea -0.06 (0.77) 0.71 (0.00) - 
Taiwan 0.04 (0.84) 0.80 (0.00) 0.71 (0.00)  - 




Table 1.6 Variance decomposition of real GDP growth 
 
 S.E Supply Shock 
Exchange 
Rate Shock Monetary Shock Demand Shock
China 
1  0.023  79.69  8.05  9.19  3.06 
5  0.029  82.19  6.50  7.10  4.20 
10  0.029  81.79  6.44  7.06  4.72 
Japan 
1  0.016  21.39  10.38  11.51  56.71 
5  0.021  39.12  8.27  15.53  37.08 
10  0.021  39.81  8.15  15.34  36.70 
Korea 
1  0.033  11.46  19.36  50.22  18.96 
5  0.039  12.92  15.60  37.63  33.85 
10  0.039  15.06  15.21  36.58  33.14 
Taiwan 
1  0.025  38.51  0.68  13.53  47.28 
5  0.035  51.26  10.76  12.00  25.98 






Table 1.7a Correlation of supply shocks 1971-2004 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan -0.36 (0.07) -  
Korea -0.22 (0.29) 0.20 (0.27) - 
Taiwan 0.05 (0.81) 0.33 (0.06) 0.41 (0.02) - 




Table 1.7b Correlation of exchange rate shocks 1971-2004 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan 0.07 (0.73) -  
Korea 0.09 (0.65)  -0.05 (0.78) - 
Taiwan 0.45 (0.02) 0.06 (0.74) 0.16 (0.36)  - 




Table 1.7c Correlation of monetary shocks 1971-2004 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan 0.08 (0.71) -  
Korea 0.09 (0.65) 0.19 (0.29) - 
Taiwan -0.50 (0.01) 0.09 (0.61) -0.07 (0.69)  - 




Table 1.7d Correlation of demand shocks 1971-2004 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan -0.34 (0.09) -  
Korea -0.0 8(0.71) 0.27 (0.13) - 
Taiwan - 0.01 (0.96) 0.53 (0.00) 0.28 (0.12)  - 

































1  0.022  14.59  39.49  2.13  33.42  8.66  1.71 
5  0.030  15.87  35.90  2.03  38.05  6.89  1.27 
10  0.030  15.96  35.92  2.03  37.95  6.87  1.27 
Japan 
1  0.016  1.91  15.25  4.38  24.27  16.09  38.10 
5  0.022  1.78  12.50  14.04  31.65  17.07  22.97 
10  0.022  1.74  12.12  16.54  30.74  16.55  22.31 
Korea 
1  0.036  1.05  10.15  2.214  68.21  17.06  1.32 
5  0.041  2.47  12.96  3.85  60.73  18.64  1.35 
10  0.041  4.23  12.76  4.23  59.25  18.20  1.33 
Taiwan 
1  0.026  0.24  48.92  16.50  1.74  22.83  9.78 
5  0.035  10.06  30.59  14.12  20.19  17.03  8.01 




























1  0.019  57.67  0.82  14.32  22.69  0.01  4.49 
5  0.033  34.49  14.61  28.46  17.54  2.44  2.46 
10  0.036  29.70  17.81  28.05  14.42  6.56  3.48 
Korea 
1  0.036  9.67  6.26  13.49  56.31  13.58  0.69 
5  0.040  8.01  11.50  13.75  49.86  15.91  0.98 
10  0.040  8.53  11.43  13.87  49.42  15.77  0.98 
Taiwan 
1  0.026  17.08  5.34  26.80  19.40  28.46  2.92 
5  0.034  23.67  13.48  18.16  17.18  24.27  3.26 







Table 1.10 Variance decomposition of real GDP growth for the exchange rate 























1  0.019  23.70  0.45  6.48  69.36  0.00  0.00 
5  0.033  18.40  12.45  18.62  42.30  4.02  4.21 
10  0.036  18.55  13.05  20.80  35.14  5.80  6.67 
Japan 
1  0.011  84.95  0.69  3.07  11.29  0.00  0.00 
5  0.019  32.56  41.49  2.28  15.00  8.32  0.35 
10  0.020  29.67  38.83  4.46  15.80  9.43  1.81 
Korea 
1  0.036  41.29  1.77  7.35  49.59  0.00  0.00 
5  0.046  32.27  10.65  8.11  31.57  9.96  7.44 
10  0.0466  32.22  11.17  8.01  30.91  10.13  7.55 
Taiwan 
1  0.023  3.83  2.38  28.29  65.51  0.00  0.00 
5  0.031  8.97  8.14  20.49  40.80  14.65  6.96 




Table 1.11 Variance decomposition of real GDP growth for the exchange rate 
















1  0.032  0.00  42.37  56.89  0.74 
5  0.034  0.69  47.65  50.98  0.68 
10  0.035  1.13  48.81  49.38  0.68 
Japan 
1  0.018  31.15  5.52  63.33  0.00 
5  0.022  40.79  3.87  46.87  8.48 
10  0.022  40.80  3.93  45.86  9.42 
Korea 
1  0.032  30.81  12.30  12.58  44.31 
5  0.041  25.70  22.64  10.76  40.90 
10  0.042  25.91  24.09  10.32  39.68 
Taiwan 
1  0.031  48.14  1.09  45.55  5.22 
5  0.035  45.44  3.57  43.63  7.36 






Table 1.12 Literature of currency union in Asia 
 










Northeast Asia: Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan; 


































No currency union 
among the 9  East 
Asian economies 
Huang & 
















Table 1.13a Correlation of supply shocks 1971-1996 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan -0.44 (0.07) -  
Korea 0.35 (0.15) -0.22 (0.29) - 
Taiwan 0.03 (0.90) 0.46 (0.02) 0.19 (0.36) - 




Table 1.13b Correlation of exchange rate shocks 1971-1996 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan 0.14 (0.58) -  
Korea 0.16 (0.53)  -0.04 (0.84) - 
Taiwan 0.15 (0.56) -0.04 (0.83) -0.01 (0.96)  - 




Table 1.13c Correlation of monetary shocks 1971-1996 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan 0.07 (0.80) -  
Korea 0.08 (0.76) 0.01 (0.97) - 
Taiwan -0.63(0.00) 0.21 (0.31) -0.02 (0.92)  - 




Table 1.13d Correlation of demand shocks 1971-1996 
 
 China Japan Korea Taiwan 
China -  
Japan -0.38 (0.12) -  
Korea  0.10(0.70) 0.02 (0.94) - 
Taiwan - 0.03 (0.91) 0.33 (0.11) 0.61 (0.00)  - 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
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Table 2.1 List of countries 
 
 Country Name 
Emerging market 
economies 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic(*), Egypt, 
Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco(**), 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland (*), South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Venezuela 
Developing 
economies 
Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, 
Benin(**), Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria(*), Burkina 
Faso(**), Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon(**), Central African 
Republic(**), Chad(**), Republic of Congo(**), Costa Rica, Cote 
d’Ivoire(**), Croatia(*), Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea(**), Estonia(*), 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau(**), 
Honduras, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar(**), Malawi, Maldives, Mali(**), 
Moldova(*), Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Niger(**), Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Romania(*), Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal(**), Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Slovak Republic(*), Slovenia(*), Solomon Islands, Sri 
Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, 
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Togo(**), Trinidad and Tobago, 




















                                                 
23 * denotes exchange rate against German mark; **denotes exchange rate against French Franc. 
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Table 2.2 Data definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition Sources 
Exchange rates End-of-period bilateral nominal exchange rates, versus the 
German mark for the European countries(*), versus the 
French franc for selected African countries(**), and 
versus the US dollar for all others 
IFS (line ae) 
Foreign 
reserves 
Gross foreign reserves minus gold   IFS (line 1L.d) 
Interest rates Money market interest rate; if not available, Treasury-bill 
rate if available, or deposit rate if available, or lending rate  
IFS (lines 60B, 60C, 60L, 
or 60P) 
FLEX1 The ratio of standard deviation of monthly percent 
changes in nominal exchange rate to the sum of standard 
deviation of monthly percent change in foreign reserves 
and standard deviation in monthly interest rate 
 
FLEX2 The ratio of standard deviation of monthly percent 
changes in nominal exchange rate to the standard 
deviation of monthly percent changes in reserves relative 
to the monetary base in the previous period.  Reserves are 
calculated as central bank’s foreign assets net of foreign 
liabilities and government deposits at the central bank.   
IFS (lines 11, 14, 16c, 
16d) 
MISM1 Ratio of bank foreign liabilities to bank foreign assets IFS (lines 21.ZF, 
26C.ZF) 
MISM2 Ratio of bank foreign liabilities plus domestic foreign 
currency-denominated deposits to bank foreign assets 
IFS (lines 21.ZF, 
26C.ZF) and Levy-Yeyati 
(2006) 
LIAB1 Ratio of bank foreign liabilities to M2  IFS (lines 26C.ZF, 34 and 
35) 
LIAB2 Ratio of bank foreign liabilities plus domestic foreign 
currency-denominated deposits to M2 
IFS (lines 26C.ZF, 34 and 
35) and Levy-Yeyati 
(2006) 
TradeOpen  Ratio of total exports and imports of goods and services to 
GDP 
WDI 
CALiberaliz The first principle component of four IMF binary 
variables, the existence of multiple exchange rates, 
restrictions on current account, capital account 
transactions, and the requirement of the surrender of 
export proceeds 
Chinn and Ito (2006) 
FinanDevelop Sum of (standardized indices of) ratio of liquid liabilities 
to GDP and ratio of domestic credit to private sector to 
GDP 
IFS (lines 22D.ZF) and 
WDI 
Inflation Rate of change in consumer price index IFS (line 64..XZF) 
FiscalBudget Overall budget balance, including grants, to GDP WDI 
TotGr The growth rate of exports as a capacity to import (the 
current price value of exports of goods and services 
deflated by the import price index, in domestic currency) 
WDI 
RealGDPGr Rate of growth of real GDP per capita (in thousands of 




Table 2.3 Summary statistics and correlation analysis 
 
Correlation with: Variable      




FLEX1 FLEX2  MISM1 MISM2 LIAB1
FLEX1  1669 0.19 0.32 0.00 2.98
 
FLEX2       1669 24.49 44.55 0.00 397.32  0.56**
     
      
 (0.00) 
MISM1 1669 1.26 1.62 0.00 21.07 -0.09** -0.04
     
       
 (0.00) (0.12)
MISM2 778 2.73 3.37 0.04 35.41 -0.09** -0.02 0.48**
       
  
(0.01) (0.51) (0.00)
LIAB1 1669 0.12 0.13 0.00 1.28 -0.07**  0.00 0.21**  0.01  
       
  
(0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.88)
LIAB2 778 0.37 0.27 0.01 1.57 -0.07**  0.08** 0.04  0.29** 0.67** 
       (0.05) (0.02) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00)
 




Table 2.4a Multivariate Granger causality tests: Effects of balance sheets on exchange rate flexibility 
 
Dependent Variable: FLEX 
 MISM1 MISM2 
       FLEX1-OLS FLEX1-GMM FLEX2-OLS FLEX2-GMM FLEX1-OLS FLEX1-GMM FLEX2-OLS FLEX2-GMM
FLEX t-1         0.0487 0.1055*** 0.1543** 0.2059*** 0.1804** 0.2904 0.3425*** 0.3098**
 (0.0675)        (0.0387) (0.0742) (0.0714) (0.0879) (0.2422) (0.0956) (0.1528)
FLEX t-2 0.0591        
 (0.0682)        
FLEX t-3          -0.0003
 (0.0634)        
FLEX t-4          -0.0662
 (0.0664)        
MISM t-1          -0.0047 -0.0118 -0.7839 -1.1435 -0.0029 -0.0076 0.5295 -0.8219
 (0.0048)        (0.0076) (0.7505) (1.0385) (0.0044) (0.0067) (0.5493) (3.6159)
MISM t-2         -0.0096** 
 (0.0040)        
MISM t-3 0.0072*        -
 (0.0041)        
MISM t-4  -0.0009        
 (0.0011)        
TradeOpen         -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0098 -0.1315* 0.0001 -0.0029* -0.2535 -0.2523
TotGr 0.0005        0.0000 -0.1288 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0002 0.0361 -0.0517
RealGDPGr         -0.0043 0.0013 -0.4264 0.0239 -0.0070 0.0018 -0.6440 -0.9095
Inflation         -0.0014 0.0000 -0.0073 0.0166*** -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0227** 0.0078
FiscalBudget         -0.0019 0.0058 -0.4043 -0.7108 -0.0036 -0.0021 0.6026 -1.2629
FinanDevelop         0.0764 0.0634* 3.9346 4.8108* 0.2419*** 0.0931 32.3809** 7.8377
CALiberaliz         -0.0129 -0.0122 -0.4876 -2.1843 -0.0646** -0.0285* -2.7912 -1.3016
Observations         515 677 695 695 309 309 312 312
MISM GC FLEX         Y N N N N N N N
Robust standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and cluster serial correlation) for all specifications are reported in parentheses.  Year dummies are included. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
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Table 2.4b Multivariate Granger causality tests: Effects of balance sheets on exchange rate flexibility 
 
Dependent Variable: FLEX 
 LIAB1 LIAB2 
       FLEX1-OLS FLEX1-GMM FLEX2-OLS FLEX2-GMM FLEX1-OLS FLEX1-GMM FLEX2-OLS FLEX2-GMM
FLEX t-1          0.0161 0.0815** 0.1534** 0.2078*** 0.1846** 0.1762 0.3418*** 0.3150***
 (0.0409)        (0.0360) (0.0752) (0.0547) (0.0841) (0.1103) (0.0907) (0.0679)
FLEX t-2          
         
FLEX t-3          
         
FLEX t-4          
         
LIAB t-1         -0.2836** -0.4055 -22.5728 -65.7917 -0.0269 -0.3689 -3.3786 2.4804
 (0.1349)        (0.3153) (20.7530) (52.7026) (0.3216) (0.2969) (38.1976) (24.1810)
LIAB t-2         
         
LIAB t-3         
         
LIAB t-4         
         
TradeOpen         0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0020 -0.0946 -0.0000 -0.0022*** -0.2207 -0.1319
TotGr -0.0004        -0.0000 -0.1299 -0.0214 0.0000 0.0008 0.0365 0.0764
RealGDPGr         -0.0047 0.0031 -0.4440 0.0796 -0.0071 -0.0015 -0.5981 -0.6462
Inflation 0.0001    0.0001** -0.0070 0.0154*** -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0224** 0.0062 
FiscalBudget         -0.0046 0.0046 -0.4305* -0.7347 -0.0031 -0.0030 0.4409 -1.7861
FinanDevelop 0.1065*     0.0866*** 3.7371 6.4358** 0.2490*** 0.0957** 30.5628** 7.7118** 
CALiberaliz         -0.0412** -0.0086 -0.6303 -0.9526 -0.0681** -0.0076 -1.8715 -2.5054
Observations         677 677 695 695 309 309 312 312
LIAB GC FLEX         Y N N N N N N N
Robust standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and cluster serial correlation) for all specifications are reported in parentheses.  Year dummies are included. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
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Table 2.5a Multivariate Granger causality tests: Effects of exchange rate flexibility on balance sheets 
 
Dependent Variable: MISM 
 FLEX1   FLEX2 FLEX1 FLEX2
         MISM1-OLS MISM1-GMM MISM1-OLS MISM1-GMM MISM2-OLS MISM2-GMM MISM2-OLS MISM2-GMM
MISM t-1         0.4577*** 0.6350*** 0.2954** 0.4369*** 0.7997*** 0.9510*** 0.8072*** 0.9539***
 (0.0904)        (0.0654) (0.1389) (0.1437) (0.0189) (0.0367) (0.0171) (0.0667)
MISM t-2        0.2269*** 0.3140** 
        (0.0474) (0.1577)
MISM t-3          0.1045
   0.1422)      (
MISM t-4         
         
FLEX t-1 -0.0970** -0.1775* -0.0017** -0.0020** -0.1375 0.2950 -0.0006 0.0012 
 (0.0477)        (0.1050) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.2733) (0.5411) (0.0012) (0.0050)
FLEX t-2         -0.0008* -0.0004
        (0.0005) (0.0004)
FLEX t-3          -0.0005
   0.0004)      (
FLEX t-4         
         
TradeOpen         0.0042 -0.0028** 0.0069** -0.0011 0.0040 0.0038 0.0050 -0.0034
TotGr -0.0016        -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0003 0.0176 0.0205 0.0183 0.0136
RealGDPGr         0.0168 0.0079 0.0124 0.0127 0.0568 0.0486 0.0548 0.0159
Inflation         -0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0005
FiscalBudget         0.0144 0.0182 0.0113 0.0135 -0.0769 -0.0393 -0.0867 0.0124
FinanDevelop         0.1832 0.0926 0.0417 0.0477 0.1312 -0.1814* 0.0829 -0.1264
CALiberaliz         0.0584 0.0035 0.0242 -0.0023 -0.0690 -0.0669 -0.0694 0.0298
Observations         677 677 615 660 306 306 309 309
FLEX GC MISM         Y Y Y Y N N N N
Robust standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and cluster serial correlation) for all specifications are reported in parentheses.  Year dummies are included. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
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Table 2.5b Multivariate Granger causality tests: Effects of exchange rate flexibility on balance sheets 
 
Dependent Variable: LIAB 
    FLEX1 FLEX2 FLEX1 FLEX2
         LIAB1-OLS LIAB1-GMM LIAB1-OLS LIAB1-GMM LIAB2-OLS LIAB2-GMM LIAB2-OLS LIAB2-GMM
LIAB t-1         0.8380*** 0.8624*** 0.8527*** 0.3939* 0.8619*** 0.9451*** 0.8782*** 0.6870**
 (0.1184)        (0.0937) (0.1000) (0.2378) (0.1394) (0.0644) (0.1402) (0.2820)
LIAB t-2        -0.0672  -0.0683 0.2143 -0.1081  -0.1111 0.0904
 (0.1148)        (0.0999) (0.1618) (0.1340) (0.1378) (0.2445)
LIAB t-3          0.0069 -0.0259 0.0047 0.0448 0.0324 0.1404
 (0.0506)        (0.0677) (0.1889) (0.1128) (0.0981) (0.0884)
LIAB t-4         -0.0865* -0.0473 0.1222 -0.0115 -0.0319  
 (0.0485)        (0.0459) (0.1345) (0.0903) (0.0999)
FLEX t-1         -0.0110*** -0.0056 -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0391*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
 (0.0036)        (0.0040) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0083) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0005)
FLEX t-2          0.0012 -0.0000*** -0.0001 0.0074 -0.0000 -0.0002
 (0.0042)        (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0126) (0.0002) (0.0002)
FLEX t-3          -0.0044 -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0201 -0.0002*** -0.0002
 (0.0038)        (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0148) (0.0001) (0.0001)
FLEX t-4          0.0084 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0192 0.0002
 (0.0120)        (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0124) (0.0001)
TradeOpen         0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0019** -0.0001 -0.0016* -0.0001
TotGr 0.0001        -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0011** -0.0000 0.0008 0.0003
RealGDPGr         0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 0.0043* 0.0004 0.0049 -0.0001
Inflation         0.0008* -0.0000** 0.0006* -0.0001 -0.0015 0.0000 -0.0023 0.0002
FiscalBudget         0.0010 0.0012*** 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0014 0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0025
FinanDevelop         0.0049 0.0054 0.0017 0.0159** 0.1874*** 0.0033 0.1576** -0.0030
CALiberaliz         0.0040 0.0036 0.0013 0.0075** 0.0092 0.0034 0.0067 -0.0080
Observations         514 677 570 570 207 695 212 242
FLEX GC LIAB          Y N Y Y Y N Y Y
Robust standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and cluster serial correlation) for all specifications are reported in parentheses.  Year dummies are included. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
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Table 2.6 Variance decomposition for panel VAR (no contemporaneous effects 
from balance sheets to exchange rate flexibility) 
 
 FLEX1 FLEX2 MISM1 MISM2 LIAB1 LIAB2 
FLEX1  51.74    1.69    (1) MISM1   0.28  89.07    
FLEX2  78.92   0.12    (2) MISM1    4.11 85.54    
FLEX1  3.02   0.04   (3) MISM2 1.91   2.08   
FLEX2   6.43  0.00   (4) MISM2  0.36  3.00   
FLEX1  73.80      0.14  (5) LIAB1   2.25    72.99  
FLEX2  78.74     0.31  (6) LIAB1    0.17   88.47  
FLEX1  35.08       0.95 (7) LIAB2   5.71     65.95 
FLEX2  75.61      2.12 (8) LIAB2    1.98    69.90 
 
Each entry reports the percentage of variation in the row variable explained by column variable.  
Variance decomposition performed over a 10 year period.  Also included in the estimations are 









Composition of Currency 
Basket 
Botswana Crawling peg pula 
SDR and the South African 
rand 
Fiji Conventional peg dollar 
The Australian dollar, the 
yen , the New Zealand dollar, 
the euro and the U.S. dollar 
Jordan Conventional peg dinar SDR 
Latvia Conventional peg lats SDR 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya Conventional peg dinar SDR 
Malaysia Conventional peg ringgit Unknown 
Malta Conventional peg lira 
The U.S. dollar, the euro, and 
the pound sterling 
Morocco Conventional peg dirham Currencies of trading partners 
Myanmar Managed floating kyat SDR 
Samoa Conventional peg tala 
The Australian dollar, the 
euro, the Fiji dollar, the New 
Zealand dollar, and the U.S. 
dollar 
Seychelles Conventional peg rupee 
The euro, the yen, the pound 
sterling, the Singapore dollar, 
the South African rand, and 
the U.S. dollar 
Solomon 
Islands Crawling peg dollar 





horizontal bands pa’anga 
The Australian dollar, the 
yen, the New Zealand dollar, 
and the U.S. dollar 
Vanuatu Conventional peg vatu 
Currencies of major trading 
partners 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2005
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Table 3.2.a Result of simulation using numerical solver ( 0
3231












4.01 =η ; 05.031 =EPσ ; 
; 01.02
3
=Eσ 04.032 −=EPσ  








1η  1λ  23Eσ  1λ  u  1λ  31EPσ  1λ  32EPσ  1λ  
0.05 0.4526       0.005 0.4044    0.01 0.4053     0.01 0.6854    -0.01 0.2596    
0.10 0.4517 0.010 0.4464    0.02 0.4053     0.02 0.6815    -0.02 0.2724    
1.15 0.4508 0.015 0.4629    0.03 0.4053     0.03 0.6765    -0.03 0.2869    
0.20 0.4499 0.020 0.4716    0.04 0.4053     0.04 0.6699    -0.04 0.3035    
0.25 0.4490 0.025 0.4770    0.05 0.4052     0.05 0.6610    -0.05 0.3226    
0.30          0.4481 0.030 0.4807 0.06 0.4052 0.06 0.6480 -0.06 0.3451
0.35 0.4473       0.035 0.4833    0.07 0.4052     0.07 0.6284    -0.07 0.3722    
0.40 0.4464 0.040 0.4853    0.08 0.4052     0.08 0.5975    -0.08 0.4053    
0.45 0.4456 0.045 0.4869    0.09 0.4052     0.09 0.5515    -0.09 0.4464    
0.50 0.4448     0.050 0.4881    0.10 0.4052     0.10 0.4968    -0.10 0.4968    
0.55 0.4440     0.055 0.4892    0.11 0.4052     0.11 0.4464    -0.11 0.5515    
0.60          0.4432 0.060 0.4900 0.12 0.4052 0.12 0.4053 -0.12 0.5975
0.65 0.4425     0.065 0.4908    0.13 0.4052     0.13 0.3722    -0.13 0.6284    
0.70 0.4417     0.070 0.4914    0.14 0.4052     0.14 0.3451    -0.14 0.6480    
0.75 0.4410     0.075 0.4920    0.15 0.4051     0.15 0.3226    -0.15 0.6610    
0.80 0.4402     0.080 0.4924    0.16 0.4051     0.15 0.3035    -0.15 0.6699    
0.85 0.4395     0.085 0.4929    0.17 0.4051     0.17 0.2869    -0.17 0.6765    
0.90          0.4388 0.090 0.4932 0.18 0.4051 0.18 0.2724 -0.18 0.6815
0.95 0.4381     0.095 0.4936    0.19 0.4051     0.19 0.2596    -0.19 0.6854    
1.00          0.4374 0.100 0.4939 0.20 0.4051 0.20 0.2481 -0.20 0.6885
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Table 3.2.b Result of simulation using numerical solver ( 0
3231












4.01 =η ; 04.031 =EPσ ; 
; 01.02
3
=Eσ 05.032 −=EPσ  








1η  1λ  23Eσ  1λ  u  1λ  31EPσ  1λ  32EPσ  1λ  
0.05 0.5323     0.005 0.5922    0.01 0.5516     0.01 0.6854    -0.01 0.2596    
0.10 0.5347     0.010 0.5515    0.02 0.5515     0.02 0.6815    -0.02 0.2724    
1.15 0.5373     0.015 0.5349    0.03 0.5515     0.03 0.6765    -0.03 0.2869    
0.20 0.5399     0.020 0.5262    0.04 0.5514     0.04 0.6699    -0.04 0.3035    
0.25 0.5426     0.025 0.5210    0.05 0.5514     0.05 0.6610    -0.05 0.3226    
0.30          0.5454 0.030 0.5174 0.06 0.5513 0.06 0.6480 -0.06 0.3451
0.35          0.5484 0.035 0.5149 0.07 0.5513 0.07 0.6284 -0.07 0.3722
0.40 0.5515     0.040 0.5130    0.08 0.5512     0.08 0.5975    -0.08 0.4053    
0.45 0.5548     0.045 0.5115    0.09 0.5511     0.09 0.5515    -0.09 0.4464    
0.50 0.5583     0.050 0.5104    0.10 0.5511     0.10 0.4968    -0.10 0.4968    
0.55 0.5620     0.055 0.5094    0.11 0.5510     0.11 0.4464    -0.11 0.5515    
0.60          0.5659 0.060 0.5086 0.12 0.5510 0.12 0.4053 -0.12 0.5975
0.65 0.5701     0.065 0.5079    0.13 0.5509     0.13 0.3722    -0.13 0.6284    
0.70 0.5746     0.070 0.5073    0.14 0.5508     0.14 0.3451    -0.14 0.6480    
0.75 0.5795     0.075 0.5068    0.15 0.5508     0.15 0.3226    -0.15 0.6610    
0.80 0.5848     0.080 0.5064    0.16 0.5507     0.15 0.3035    -0.15 0.6699    
0.85 0.5906     0.085 0.5060    0.17 0.5506     0.17 0.2869    -0.17 0.6765    
0.90          0.5972 0.090 0.5056 0.18 0.5506 0.18 0.2724 -0.18 0.6815
0.95 0.6045     0.095 0.5053    0.19 0.5505     0.19 0.2596    -0.19 0.6854    
1.00          0.6131 0.100 0.5050 0.20 0.5504 0.20 0.2481 -0.20 0.6885
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Appendix B: Figures 
 
Source: The website of Ministry of Finance, Japan. http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/CMI_051109.pdf 
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             Response of FLEX1 to MISM1 shock 
 
  
                                               Response of MISM1to FLEX1 shock       
                                                                                             
 
                                                Response of FLEX2 to MISM1 shock      
 
  
                                                Response of MISM1 to FLEX2 shock 
 
The panel VAR also includes FinanDevelop, CALiberaliz, TradeOpen, and Inflation. Errors are 5 
percent on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 200 repetitions. The number of lag for FLEX1 is 1, 
and that for FLEX2 is 4. 
 
Figure 2.3 Impulse-response functions for external mismatches and exchange rate 




                                                  Response of FLEX1 to MISM1 shock 
 
    
                                                      Response of MISM1 to FLEX1 shock 
 
        
                                                        Response of FLEX2 to MISM1 shock 
 
          
                                                       Response of MISM1 to FLEX2 shock 
 
 
The panel VAR also includes FinanDevelop, CALiberaliz, TradeOpen, and Inflation. Errors are 5 
percent on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 200 repetitions. The number of lag for FLEX1 is 1, 
and that for FLEX2 is 4. 
 
Figure 2.4 Impulse-response functions for external mismatches and exchange 
rate flexibility (no contemporaneous effects from flexibility to mismatches) 
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              Response of FLEX1 to MISM2 shock 
 
 
              Response of MISM2 to FLEX1 shock 
 
   
              Response of FLEX2 to MISM2 shock 
 
       
              Response of MISM2 to FLEX2 shock 
 
The panel VAR also includes FinanDevelop, CALiberaliz, TradeOpen, and Inflation. Errors are 5 
percent on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 200 repetitions. The number of lags for FLEX1 is 
3, and that for FLEX2 is 2. 
 
Figure 2.5 Impulse-response functions for total mismatches and exchange rate 




                 Response of FLEX1 to MISM2 shock 
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                  Response of FLEX2 to MISM2 shock 
 
        
                  Response of MISM2 to FLEX2 shock 
 
The panel VAR also includes FinanDevelop, CALiberaliz, TradeOpen, and Inflation. Errors are 5 
percent on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 200 repetitions. The number of lags for FLEX1 is 
3, and that for FLEX2 is 2. 
 
Figure 2.6 Impulse-response functions for total mismatches and exchange rate 
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               Response of LIAB1 to FLEX1 shock 
 
   
                Response of FLEX2 to LIAB1 shock 
 
      
                Response of LIAB1 to FLEX2 shock 
 
The panel VAR also includes FinanDevelop, CALiberaliz, TradeOpen, and Inflation. Errors are 5 
percent on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 200 repetitions. The number of lags for FLEX1 is 
4, and that for FLEX2 is 1. 
 
Figure 2.7 Impulse-response functions for external dollar liabilities and exchange 





                 Response of FLEX1 to LIAB1 shocks 
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                  Response of LIAB1 to FLEX2 shock 
 
The panel VAR also includes FinanDevelop, CALiberaliz, TradeOpen, and Inflation. Errors are 5 
percent on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 200 repetitions. The number of lags for FLEX1 is 
4, and that for FLEX2 is 1. 
 
Figure 2.8 Impulse-response functions for external dollar liabilities and exchange 




                Response of FLEX1 to LIAB2 shock 
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                    Response of FLEX2 to LIAB2 shock 
 
       
                      Response of LIAB2 to FLEX2 shock 
 
The 4-lag panel VAR also includes FinanDevelop, CALiberaliz, TradeOpen, and Inflation. Errors are 5 
percent on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 200 repetitions. 
 
Figure 2.9 Impulse-response functions for total dollar liabilities and exchange 
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The 4-lag panel VAR also includes FinanDevelop, CALiberaliz, TradeOpen, and Inflation. Errors are 5 
percent on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 200 repetitions. 
 
Figure 2.10 Impulse-response functions for total dollar liabilities and exchange 
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